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7TESEV’s Presentation 
ties or a pluralist perspective. On the contrary, 
each community started to have their own 
media, and many habits, from social manipula-
tion to voluntary censorship, became the 
common traits of the whole sector.
Today, the Turkish media faces the problem of 
pressure from the state and from governments, 
as much as it faces problems stemming from 
its own capital structures and ideological 
choices. What’s more, this situation is taking 
place in a country that still cannot put 
democratic laws in place and that maintains a 
conception of law that is foreign to freedom of 
expression and of media.  
The democratization of the media is vital in 
terms of creating independent and civilian 
supervision of politics and bureaucracy and 
ensuring that social demands find their voice in 
the public domain. And this requires a change 
in the legal framework and in the ownership 
structure, as well as in the actually functioning 
rules of competition. Yet, a transformation in 
the mentality of the media in parallel with the 
domain of politics is also necessary.
In the coming months, TESEV will present the 
public with a variety of studies on this critical 
area. This initial report is the first in a series of 
publications that will be presented, and 
summarizes the historical background of the 
media and the past and present of media-
related legal arrangements. We hope that the 
report will offer a meaningful contribution 
toward triggering discussion on the domain of 
media, which is one of the main building blocks 
that will ensure Turkey’s democratization.  
The depiction of the media as the fourth estate 
by the theory of democracy makes a reference 
to an idealized societal system. While this 
situation reflects a limited reality even in 
Western countries, it is almost entirely 
unrealistic in Turkey since the tutelary regime 
set up and systematized by the Republic has 
made relations with the army vital for the 
media and positioned the press as a conveyor 
of the official ideology and national issues. 
This situation also gained an identity-based 
meaning within the community structure 
reinforced by the republic. To the extent that it 
acted as the voice of the “centre” defined by 
the state, the media also represented the 
identity-related aspect of this centre. Hence, a 
media world was born that ‘other-ized’ those 
who were outside the centre and that gained 
privileges and concessions by advocating 
laicism and the Turkish ethnic identity.
Using political power to take advantage of 
cyclical opportunities resulted in the media 
evolving towards an oligopolistic structure 
while gaining a denominational character, and 
at the same time expanding towards the other 
areas of the economy where it created 
monopolist advantages. Hence, media organs 
started to see themselves as political actors 
that could bargain with the government, an 
approach that rapidly corrupted the sector. 
On the other hand, with the broadening of the 
area of politics within the last two decades, 
diversification and pluralisation was experien-
ced in the media. Unfortunately, this situation 
did not imply a transformation in the mentali-
Etyen Mahçupyan, TESEV Democratization Program
8further in the direction of the former approach. 
It offers a significant survey of the historical 
development and the present structure of 
Turkish media, especially in view of the process 
of democratisation, freedom of the press and 
the potential role the media play in this 
process. 
A major obstacle appears to be the old 
legislation that is a legacy of the tutelary 
structure, which is itself a legacy of the past 
military interventions. The report gives an 
extensive account of how these old elitist 
tutelary structures (both the judiciary and the 
military) and old regulations restrict and 
manipulate media content in implicit as well as 
explicit ways. This is a complex issue for it is 
not simply the presence of old elite behaviour 
and repressive legislation which restrict the 
media but a whole tutelary, patrimonial and 
repressive tradition and habits permeated into 
the political and institutional structure, 
including political parties, pressure groups and 
elected governments all of which would like to 
instrumentalize media for their own benefit. 
Thus the old structures and habits persist 
within the gradual process of emergence of 
democratic reform and liberalisation. As a 
result, the new media legislation is often a 
strange mixture of the old and new: it brings 
up new freedoms while maintaining the old 
repressive habits in between the lines (the 
Press Law of 2004 being a prime example). 
Generally speaking, although there are a 
number of positive developments such as a 
new public television channel in Kurdish, many 
Preface
The role of media in political and civic life is 
undeniable. The famous expression attributed 
to Edmund Burke, the “fourth estate,” refers to 
the institutional and political influence of the 
media over political affairs and government. 
This power can be seen in two different ways: 
either the media are perceived as having an 
instrumental role in communicating informati-
on as well as various opinions that exist in 
society and thus providing a common ground 
for public discussion; or, it can be seen as 
deciding what is worth telling and setting the 
agenda, and further determining the vocabu-
lary and syntax of political culture under the 
pressure of political and economic powers. 
In a period of democratisation such as we have 
in Turkey, the former, instrumental approach 
appears as imperative, for nothing seems more 
urgent than having a healthy and free environ-
ment of public discussion to which each and 
every voice has access, and the media are a 
major strategic actor in providing this environ-
ment. Yet the latter approach seems also 
inevitable given that the instrument that is 
called the media is itself an institution which is 
subject to and under the control of powerful 
social, political and economic forces and 
interests, and which has its own rules and 
language that are not always amenable to 
democratic debate and argumentation 
(spectacularisation, sensationalism, tabloidi-
sation, etc). The following report appears to 
have been written in the critical spirit of the 
latter approach in order to push the Turkish 
media, legislators, politicians and society 
Mahmut Mutman, Istanbul Şehir University, Department of Cinema and Television
9of the 28 February “postmodern coup,” further 
complicate an already fragile process of 
democratisation. Eventually, the mainstream 
media continue to be instrumentalized by the 
three major branches of the state: the judiciary, 
the military and the government. This is a 
situation in which the multiple voices of civil 
society can find little room. 
The report thus gives significant room to small 
though effective minority and alternative 
media which depend on limited financial 
means and have to operate in a repressive 
legal and political context. In the mainstream 
public sphere, the survival of the alternative 
press organs such as the newspaper Taraf and 
the weekly Nokta (which in fact no longer 
survives) has been made possible by the heroic 
efforts of a couple of journalists. The minority 
media confront similar circumstances. In this 
respect, the most interesting site is the 
internet (personal blogs, interactive sites), 
especially what is called the “social media” 
where there is a considerable degree of 
freedom of expression and a variety of 
different voices even though the use of 
internet or public access is not at an optimum 
level. Hence it is important to underline two 
major gains of democratisation which came 
with the new media. They increase citizen 
participation in the production of media 
content; and they provide an alternative space 
for the production of politically dissident views 
or controversial news which cannot pass 
through the filters of the mainstream media. 
On the negative side however, as the report 
underlines, there is a manifest use of hate 
speech, racism and sexism at a significant level 
in the social media and internet. This is an 
alarming note, for, if social media gives voice to 
society independently of the mainstream 
media, then the presence of such language 
expresses tendencies that already exist in 
aspects of the new legislation as well as the 
remnants of the old put serious restrictions on 
the freedom of press and television. The new 
regulatory agencies that appeared in the 
process (especially RTÜK) also have conside-
rable punitive power and appear as further 
instances of this problematic reality. Penal law 
as well as the “Anti-Terror Law” has provisions 
that significantly curtail media freedom and 
thus indirectly control the media output.  
The report shows how the liberalisation of the 
media law, the opening of private television 
channels and the concomitant process of 
globalisation has had a compound effect on 
Turkish media, politics and society. From this 
point of view, liberalisation presents a dual 
picture. On the one hand, this process brought 
on an immense proliferation of various media 
from all kinds of weekly magazines to a vast 
array of radio stations, television channels and 
local media and press, and most importantly, it 
opened up an entirely new avenue of public 
expression such as the internet. On the other 
hand, liberalisation and privatisation had the 
immediate effect of monopolisation in the 
media and the emergence of big media 
companies with investment in other areas as 
well (what the report calls “cross-
monopolisation”). The entry of big capital into 
the media sector had a number of structural 
effects: it left no room for smaller media 
companies and led to the commercialisation of 
information and tabloidisation of newspapers. 
Further, as the press changed hands from a 
small number of newspaper owners to 
powerful businessmen, each of whom had 
several channels, newspapers and weeklies, 
there emerged a new economic pressure group 
with considerable lobbying power over media 
legislation. These powerful pressure groups, 
the old tutelary elites on the one hand and the 
new economic elite on the other, and someti-
mes in alliance with each other as in the case 
10
society, hence the absolute significance of 
raising a new democratic awareness in, by and 
through the media. Interestingly, there is a 
slightly emerging interest in women’s issues 
and male-chauvinism as a problem (mainly due 
to the increasing number of cases of extreme 
male violence), while racism is a word that gets 
used very rarely and almost never in the 
mainstream media -except the general and 
worn- out phrase “the Kurdish question.” 
Given this picture, the widespread use of hate 
speech and racist slurs against Kurds and 
Armenians in the social media is a truly 
frightening reality and shows once more that 
the question of democratisation goes much 
further and deeper than producing democratic 
legislation and directly involves the question 
of changing a vast repertoire of behaviour, 
manners and habits of thought and language, 
which are full of extremisms and violence 
regarded as normal.
All in all, the report offers a comprehensive 
critical analysis of Turkish media in view of the 
social, political and ethical task of democrati-
sation. We hope that it will be of great help to 
media professionals, future analysts as well as 
politicians, legislators and the public. 
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This report is an attempt to understand the 
relationship between media and democracy in 
Turkey. Towards that end, it situates the media 
in its political and historical context. It argues 
that Turkey’s media structure falls under the 
“Mediterranean or Polarised Pluralistic Model” 
blogs and interactive internet sites of the 
traditional media allowed citizens to become 
visible and finally have a voice, increasing 
citizens’ participation in the production of 
media content. Traditional media, which 
consists of large companies and is usually 
dependent on government/state subsidies, 
has lost its monopoly and its control over 
content. Media studies have named the digital 
age “the uncontrollable age” and considered 
the increase in citizens’ participation in media 
content as a plus in the name of democratizati-
on, often overlooking the potential or real 
implications of the new media on individual 
rights and liberties. 
Introduction*
Mass communication studies have gone 
1through three different periods. In the period 
1910-40, they concentrated on the media’s 
“bullet effect” on the masses. Accordingly, the 
media had absolute power in manipulating the 
political agenda of societies and shaping their 
passive members. Media studies of the time 
pointed out the use of the media as a propa-
ganda tool by totalitarian regimes during 
World War I. During the second period from 
1940-60, field research mainly carried out in 
the United States showed that the impact of 
the media on the masses was actually limited. 
Finally, in the third period from the 1960s to 
the present day, media studies have tried to 
look into the ideological features of media 
power in relation to its economic structure. 
Today, as a result of the rapid change in 
communication technology, we find ourselves 
in the so-called “digital age.” The media 
ecology has been deeply reshaped with the 
emergence of the internet, which has had a 
destructive effect on the horizontal relations 
between the “sender” and the “receiver” as 
well as on inequalities in society. Personal 
* We are grateful to TESEV Democratization 
Program’s Esra Bakkalbaşıoğlu for meticulously 
preparing this report for publication and 
particularly for the tables, and Ebru İlhan for her 
invaluable research support. We woud also like to 
thank Mahmut Mutman of Şehir University and 
Ceren Sözeri of Galatasaray University for their 
thought-provoking comments on earlier drafts of 
this report. That being said, the responsibility of 
the content of this report belongs solely to its 
authors. 
Media studies have considered the increase in citizens’ 
participation in media content as a plus in the name of 
democratization, often overlooking the potential or real 
implications of the new media on individual rights and liberties. 
The media ecology has been deeply reshaped with the 
emergence of the internet, which has had a destructive effect 
on the horizontal relations between the “sender” and the 
“receiver” as well as on inequalities in society. 
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is quite low and the media indeed has a 
tradition of advocacy journalism. The media 
sector is divided into aggregations where the 
owners of the big media groups are also 
investors and shareholders in different sectors 
of the economy such as health, education, 
construction, telecommunications and 
distribution; they use their power in the media 
sector to maximize their economic gains in 
other industries. Although the owners of big 
media groups may have different ideological 
stands and political positions as well as 
conflicting economic interests, they by and 
large share the same “mindset” in upholding 
the “interests of the state” and “national 
security” above democracy, human rights and 
media freedom. Thus, the seeming diversity of 
the media due to the multitude of media 
companies is misleading. Furthermore, while 
the emergence of journalism dates back to the 
late Ottoman era, it is not possible to speak of 
an autonomous profession which is immune to 
pressure from politicians, interest groups, state 
institutions, the army and the judiciary. The 
level of unionization in the media continues to 
be extremely low, owing to the pressure coming 
from media owners the overall weakness of 
labour unions in Turkey and the level of labour 
exploitation to be high.  
The multiplicity of conflicting interests in the 
media and the economic liberalization of the 
early 1990s have resulted in a complex regula-
tory framework, both in terms of structure and 
content. While the various media-specific laws 
that regulate the field have quite positive 
aspects, in practice the courts, law enforce-
ment officers and the government take 
advantage of the legal loopholes or the wide 
margin of appreciation granted to the imple-
menters to significantly restrict and at times 
nullify freedom of speech and freedom of the 
media. While press freedom is protected under 
the constitution, the judiciary has a tendency to 
developed by Hallin and Mancini1 which is 
based on four criteria, namely: (1) the develop-
ment of media markets, in particular the 
development of the mass circulation press; (2) 
political parallelism, or “the extent to which 
the media system reflects the major divisions 
in society”; (3) the development of journalistic 
professionalism; and (4) the degree and nature 
of state intervention in the media system.2 
According to the Mediterranean Model, ‘the 
media in Southern Europe share some major 
characteristics: low levels of newspaper 
circulation, a tradition of advocacy reporting, 
instrumentalisation of privately owned media, 
politicisation of public broadcasting and 
broadcast regulation and limited development 
of journalism as an autonomous profession.’3 
Turkey presents a typical example of the 
Mediterranean Model. Newspaper circulation 
1  Hallin and Mancini have developed three media 
models in Western Europe and North America: (1) 
Polarized Pluralist or Mediterranean Model (for 
Southern European countries, like France, Greece 
and Italy); (2) Democratic Corporatist or North/
Central European Model (Germany, Netherlands, 
Scandinavian countries); (3) Liberal or North 
Atlantic Model (United States, Great Britain, 
Canada). See E. Özcan, “The Role of the State in 
Turkish Media in Light of Hallin and Mancini’s 
Comparative Media Systems”, Paper presented at 
the annual meeting of the International 
Communication Association, TBA, San Francisco, 
CA Online <PDF>; available at: http://www.
allacademic.com/meta/p170690_index.html (last 
visited on 07 May 2010).
2  Ibid.
3  S. Papathanassopoulos, “The Mediterranean/
Polarized Pluralist Media Model Countries,” in G. 
Terzis (ed.) European Media Governance: National 
and Regional Dimensions (2005), p. 192.
While the emergence of journalism dates back to the late 
Ottoman era, it is not possible to speak of an autonomous 
profession which is immune to pressure from politicians, 
interest groups, state institutions, the army and the judiciary. 
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The main factor accounting for the co-existence of democratic 
reforms and the continuation of the status quo is the 
prevalent political culture and the historical origins of state-
media relations in Turkey. 
censor dissident and minority media organs 
under the pretext of combating terrorism, 
preserving territorial unity and protecting the 
state.
The banking crisis of 2000-2001, which has had 
significant repercussions for the media sector 
in Turkey, and the commencement of the 
European Union (EU) membership process 
around the same time have further complica-
ted the regulatory framework. While relative 
progress has been achieved in recent years in 
regulating media ownership and enhancing 
media freedom and pluralism, the media sector 
continues to be in flux and unstable. Further, 
the laws governing the sector preserve their 
inconsistent and restrictive nature. The 
economic and political transition brought by 
the post-crisis restructuring of the financial 
sector and the EU accession process increased 
the role of the regulatory bodies in the media, 
resulting in administrative agencies becoming 
one of the key players. However, despite 
relative progress achieved in recent years, 
Turkey continues to fall far below the goal of 
harmonizing its legal framework with the EU’s 
acquis communitaire. This report argues that 
the main factor accounting for the co-
existence of democratic reforms and the 
continuation of the status quo is the prevalent 
political culture and the historical origins of 
state-media relations in Turkey. An informed 
analysis of media policies and regulation in the 
country necessitates a careful reading of the 
historical and political context, particularly 
the state’s formative years. 
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Historical Background:  
Development of the Media in Turkey 
multi-party system was installed, journalists 
were instrumental in propagating the moderni-
sing reforms of the one-party regime.4 Journa-
lists were both the object and the subject of 
the state-driven modernisation movements in 
Turkey.    In this sense, the press has traditio-
nally dealt with “discussions” rather than 
“news.”5 From the outset, most of the press had 
a crucial role in the modernisation project and 
developed a politically and economically 
interdependent relationship with the state. 
Dissident press, on the other hand has been 
the potential target of state/government 
repression or pressure. 
In the early-Republican era, most of the 
journalists were also writers and their literary 
writings influenced their journalistic reporting. 
The first journalists of Turkey can be described 
as “self-taught” and today, although there are 
some media members in the sector who are 
graduates of schools of journalism or commu-
4  T. Demirel and M. Heper, “The Press and the 
Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey”, 32/2 
Middle Eastern Studies (April 1996), p. 109-123, 113.
5  E. E. Bilgiç, “The Role of the Press in the 
Construction of National Identity 1934-1937”, 
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Boğaziçi University 
(2010), p. 27.
This section provides an overview of the 
political context in Turkey, with a particular 
focus on the historical development of 
state-media relations. It discusses the 
evolution of the media and democracy in 
Turkey on the basis of the national and 
international anchors of political and social 
change: the foundation of the republic, the 
evolution of multi-party democracy, military 
interventions, economic liberalisation, 
globalization and EU-induced democratisation. 
The evolution of the press, radio and television 
in Turkey is examined during the following 
principal periods [excluding the military 
regime between 1980 and 1983 when all means 
of communication were under the control of 
the military]: the single party regime from 1923 
to 1950, the multi-party regime from 1950 to 
1980, the intervening periods of military rule, 
and the “liberalisation process” of the 1980s 
and 1990s. Finally, the impact of the internatio-
nal dimension will be examined on the basis of 
legal and political developments introduced in 
the media sector as a result of globalization, 
the economic crisis of 2000-2001 and the 
ongoing EU accession process.  
1.1. THE SINGLE PARTY REGIME: 
INSTRUMENTALIzATION OF THE 
MEDIA BY THE STATE
In both the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish 
Republic, journalists played an important role 
in the introduction of Western values and 
institutions to society. From 1923, when the 
republic was proclaimed, until 1950 when a 
Journalists were both the object and the subject of the state-
driven modernisation movements in Turkey. In this sense, the 
press has traditionally dealt with “discussions” rather than 
“news.” 
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nication departments, this feature remains 
true. 
The establishment of the print media in Turkey 
predates that of the republic. The first 
newspaper was founded during the Ottoman 
times, in the final years of the empire when 
Mustafa Kemal pioneered a war of indepen-
dence against the Allied powers. The indepen-
dance movement which culminated in the 
foundation of the republic in 1923 was based 
on two primary principles: Battle and Corres-
pondence. In the transition from a decaying 
empire to a modern nation state, Mustafa 
Kemal and his staff prioritised the print media, 
the only widespread medium of communicati-
on at the time, in reaching out to the masses. 
The National Sovereignty (Hakimiyet-i Milliye) 
newspaper was established by Mustafa Kemal 
himself in Ankara on 10 January 1920. Later 
renamed Ulus, the paper aimed at publicising 
Mustafa Kemal’s major decisions during the 
War of Independence. The Anatolian Agency 
(Anadolu Ajansı), created on 6 April 1920, 
shared the same goal. The main objective 
behind the foundation of Anadolu Ajansı was 
to disseminate to the national and internatio-
nal public “true” news about the Turkish 
Independence War.6
Another example of the instrumentalisation of 
the media during the years of state formation 
was Mustafa Kemal’s national tours, which 
sought to rally support in favour of the 
Independence War and instill the spirit of 
nationalism across the country. These trips 
continued after the Republic was founded, 
with the aim of consolidating the regime, 
overcoming educational, health and economic 
6  Following the establishment of the republic, 
Anadolu Ajansı continued to serve the objectives 
of Atatürk’s government by propagating at the 
international level the righteousness of the newly 
founded Turkish state.   
problems, and laying the groundwork for 
forthcoming reforms. The press was always 
invited to Ataturk’s appearances, which were 
also attended by military and civilian experts. 
The creation of the republic was primarily a 
top-down project and the press was a vital 
element for the founding elite to proclaim its 
republican values. While Mustafa Kemal and 
the founding elite created their own media 
networks, they were careful to also establish 
good relations with the existing media. Soon, 
however, state-media relations began to 
change. One principal reason for this change 
was the fragmentation of the People’s Party 
(Halk Fırkası)-the political party founded by 
Mustafa Kemal—by a group intent on forming 
its own party, the Developmentalist Republi-
can Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası) in 
1924.
Support from both the people and the press of 
Istanbul for Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası as 
the first opposition party in the history of 
Turkey was perceived as a threat to the regime. 
Under the pretext of suppressing the Kurdish 
Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925, martial law was 
declared in the southeastern region of Turkey. 
The Law on the Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i 
Sükûn Kanunu) was enacted, which stifled 
freedom of the press and quashed all oppositi-
on in the country.7 In accordance with this law, 
13 oppositional journalists along with rebels 
and dissenting politicians were tried in the 
Independence Courts (İstiklâl Mahkemeleri) 
and most were exiled. Terakkiperver Cumhuri-
yet Fırkası and 15 newspapers critical of the 
7  One of the three articles of Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu 
read: “The head of the government—with the 
approval of the president—is entitled to ban any 
organization, provocation, encouragement and 
publications aimed at reactionism, rebellion, and 
disruption of social order, social peace, security 
and public order. The government may hand over 
persons suspected of these actions to the 
Independence Court.”
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In 1936, the company’s request for contract 
renewal was rejected on the grounds that its 
programming did not live up to the standards 
of contemporary radio broadcasting. Through 
an edict issued in the same year, radio 
broadcasts began to be carried out by the 
state itself. The company’s transmitters were 
transferred to the Postal, Telephone and 
Telegraph Authority (Posta, Telefon ve Telgraf 
Genel Müdürlüğü- PTT), which marked the 
beginning of the period of state monopoly in 
broadcasting which would last until 1964. In 
1939, Ankara Radio began to broadcast news 
bulletins in foreign languages in order to keep 
other nations informed about Turkey’s stance 
and policies. In its broadcasting during the 
Second World War, this station emphasized 
Turkey’s neutrality. 
Law no. 3837 of 22 May 1940 established what 
is today called the Directorate General of Press 
and Information (Basın, Yayın ve Enformasyon 
Genel Müdürlüğü- BYEGM), a public body 
presently under the Office of the Prime 
Ministry. In the preamble he wrote to this law, 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk defined BYEGM’s 
purposes as follows: “On the one hand we 
need to bring out publications with an aim to 
defend our national and legitimate cause and 
to constantly scrutinize the foreign press to 
understand the flow of ideas, while on the 
other hand we need to bring out publications 
within the nation to produce a union of ideas 
and spirits as the modern time dictates.”10
In 1949, Izmir Municipality also established a 
radio station, which was transformed into a 
state-run enterprise in 1953. Izmir thus 
became the third major center for radio 
10  Basın, Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü 
(Directorate General of Press and Information 
- BYEGM), History and Function, available at: 
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/sayfa.aspx?Id=61 (last 
visited on 8 October 2010).
government were shut down and only those 
newspapers that had supported the law were 
allowed to operate.
The 1928 the Alphabet Reform, which replaced 
Ottoman script with the Latin alphabet, 
radically changed Turkish society’s relations-
hip to its past; it is largely responsible for the 
lack of an independent media in Turkey. The 
transition to the Latin alphabet rendered 
useless the existing technology that media 
owners had at the time. The state provided 
financial support to publishers who were 
forced to change their infrastructure to adjust 
to the new lettering system. The publishers’ 
financial dependence to the government 
created an opening for the monitoring and 
control of ideas.8 
During the 27 years the Republican People’s 
Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi - CHP) ruled the 
country in a single-party government, all forms 
of opposition were silenced. In 1927, just two 
years after the world’s first radio broadcasts 
had started; two public enterprises co-founded 
a media company called the Turkish Wireless 
Telephony (Türk Telsiz Telefon A.Ş- TTAŞ) and 
launched Ankara and Istanbul-based radio 
broadcasting. These two enterprises were 
Anadolu Ajansı and Türkiye İş Bankası; the 
latter had CHP as a shareholder. With the 
establishment of TTAŞ, ‘broadcasting became 
part of the state machinery from day one even 
though it was not directly run by the state.’9 
The company followed BBC as a model for its 
modus operandi and negotiated a 10-year 
contract with the government.   
8  Bilgiç, 2010, p. 35.
9  B. Sümer, The Impact of Europeanisation on 
Policy-Making in Turkey: Controversies, 
Uncertainties and Misfits in Broadcasting Policy 
(1999-2009), Ankara University European Research 
Center Research Series, No: 35 (2010), p. 106.
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broadcasting in Turkey after Ankara and 
Istanbul. 
The first decade of radio broadcasting under 
state monopoly demonstrates the use of radio 
in the establishment and consolidation of 
official ideology. The most striking of these 
was the two year ban on playing traditional 
folk music on the radio. In his address to 
parliament in 1934, Atatürk noted that the 
music being broadcast at the time was far from 
perfect and that “it is necessary to collect 
noble expressions describing elaborate 
emotions and ideas and process them accor-
ding to the contemporary music norms.”11 
Following Atatürk’s speech, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs dictated that Istanbul and 
Ankara radios play pieces ‘composed according 
to the classical Western technique.’ This ban 
continued through 1935 and into the first half 
of 1936. During this period, a considerable 
number of people who had been accustomed 
to listening to traditional music now tuned 
their antennas to the radios of Egypt, Crimea 
and Yerevan so as to be able to listen to Arabic 
and Armenian songs; these were closer to the 
folk music of Turkey than classical Western 
music. Implemented in the name of moderni-
sing society, the ban was yet another instance 
of the instrumentalization of the media by the 
government, which had highly identified itself 
with the state, in order to have direct control 
over society. The transition to the multi-party 
regime did not alter this reality.  
11  G. Gökçe, “Sanat Kurumlarının Oluşmasında 
Atatürk’ün Rolü,” (The Role of Atatürk in the 
establishment of the Art Agencies) 18/VI Atatürk 
Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi (1990), p. 707-713, 709.
Following the dissolution of Terakkiperver Cum-
huriyet Fırkası, Atatürk-who was still the 
president of the country—founded another 
opposition party in 1930 under the name of the 
Free Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet 
Fırkası). With the closure of this party shortly 
after its establishment because of being 
perceived by the ruling elites as ‘a threat 
against the regime’, there remained no 
medium for the expression of dissent in the 
country until the 1950s. By 1945, major 
landowners, the rural population (comprising 
80% of the entire population at the time) and 
the Turkish bourgeoisie were discontent due to 
heavy taxes (1942 Wealth Tax,12 tax on 
agricultural products), increasing inflation and 
land reform. At a time when Turkey had to 
comply with democratic principles after having 
signed the UN Treaty in 1945, it was no longer 
possible to continue with the single party 
regime. In 1947 Turkey accepted the Truman 
Doctrine; consequently, the Marshall Plan 
required Turkey to embrace democracy and a 
free market economy. This stipulation paved 
the way for the formation of the Democrat 
Party (Demokrat Parti- DP) and the transition 
to a multi-party system with DP’s defeat of 
CHP in the 1950 national elections. 
12  The 1942 Wealth Levy Tax, No. 4305, levied 
disproportionately high taxes on non-Muslims, 
discriminating between similarly situated 
Muslims and non-Muslims for the purpose of 
transferring wealth from the latter to the former. 
Non-Muslims unable to pay the high taxes within 
the one month period were transferred to labour 
camps around the country. This discriminatory 
treatment ended de facto in December 1943 with 
the release of the remaining non-Muslims from 
the labour camps, and de iure with the annulment 
of the law on 15 March 1944. A. Aktar, Varlık 
Vergisi ve ‘Türkleştirme’ Politikaları (2000), p. 
135-153.
Radio broadcasting under state monopoly demonstrates the 
use of radio in the establishment and consolidation of official 
ideology. 
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joined the Homeland Front, DP’s political 
extension, were announced on a daily basis on 
the radio to create an uneasy kind of surveil-
lance effect on society. In short, radio became 
a tool for “manufacturing consent”15 and 
monitoring the society. 
1.3. MILITARY REGIMES AND  
THE MEDIA
Turkey has witnessed three military interventi-
ons in the conventional sense, whereby the 
army overthrew the elected government and 
took over power. Each of the coup d’etats in 
1960, 1971 and 1980 was followed by a period of 
military rule, which had significant repercussi-
ons for media freedom. 
The most significant development in mass 
communications following the 27 May 1960 
coup d’état, which brought down DP, was the 
establishment of the Turkish Radio and 
Broadcasting Corporation (Türkiye Radyo ve Te-
levizyon Kurumu- TRT) in 1964. On the other 
hand, the 1960s were also a time of conside-
rable social and political activity in the country, 
when leftist, nationalist and Islamic move-
ments became visible in the public sphere. 
Paradoxically, the 1961 Constitution enacted 
after the 1960 coup institutionalized the 
tutelage of the military and the judiciary over 
elected governments on the one hand, and 
widened the scope of freedom of expression 
and association on the other. Public television 
broadcasting was launched in 1967 under 
these circumstances and gradually became the 
most innovative and effective means through 
which the state reached the masses. The TRT’s 
television and radio channels began their 
broadcasting every day with the national 
anthem. The news headlines followed the 
15  E. S. Herman and N. Chomsky, Manufacturing 
Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media 
(1988).
1.2. MULTI-PARTY YEARS:  
THE MANIPULATIVE FUNCTION 
OF THE MEDIA 
DP’s coming to power in 1950 gave rise to great 
expectations for democratisation in the 
country. In response to demands for greater 
freedoms, DP named freedom of the press a 
matter of priority. On 15 July 1950, a liberal 
press law was adopted, soon followed by a law 
granting journalists social rights. Yet, three 
years later, legal amendments designed to 
increase government control over the press 
and universities were adopted. Press organs 
critical of the government were subjected to 
censorship. By 1955, court cases against the 
press had increased. 
The media in Turkey, restricted in its content by 
the state from its very inception, has often 
been used as a medium of manipulation.13 The 
DP rule between 1956 and 1960 was no 
exception. The government introduced legal 
restrictions on freedom of the press and closed 
down the journalists’ union. The radio turned 
into a political apparatus of the government, 
causing the 1950s to be known as the “partisan 
radio” years.14 The names of citizens who 
13  One of the prime examples of this were the 
incidents of 6-7 September 1955, when 
government-backed violent mobs attacked 
unarmed non-Muslim civilians and their property 
and institutions in Istanbul. The incidents were 
triggered by a news item in the Istanbul Ekspress 
Newspaper that Atatürk’s house in Thessaloniki 
had been bombed. At a time when relations with 
Greece were strained over Cyprus, this “news” 
incited attacks on non-Muslim minorities, which 
had hitherto been tolerated and even supported 
by the state. The incidents resulted in the 
declaration of martial law and the issuing of bans 
on the press. It was later found out that the item 
in question had been a product of yellow 
journalism. D. Güven, Cumhuriyet Dönemi Azınlık 
Stratejileri ve Politikaları Bağlamında 6–7 Eylül 
Olayları (2006).
14  Sümer, 2010, p. 108, citing M. Aksoy, Partizan 
Radyo ve DP (1960).
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order of state protocol, i.e. news related to the 
president preceded those concerning the prime 
minister, causing TRT reporting to be labeled 
as “protocol reporting.” Having said that, 
while the TRT has always preserved its 
instrumentality as the medium of the indoctri-
nation for official ideology, it has also held an 
important place in the Turkish media by 
providing information for the masses and 
introducing political and social issues to 
society, for instance during the short period of 
leadership under İsmail Cem, TRT began 24 
hour broadcasting in 1974. With the drop in the 
price of TV sets, the number of houses with 
televisions proliferated. 
Turkey experienced its second military coup in 
1970, which was followed by a period of great 
political instability, particularly in the final 
years of the decade. Between 1974 and 1980, 
TRT became the battle ground for the political 
struggle between the National Front govern-
ments16 and CHP. Military regimes established 
after each coup d’état also sought to seize the 
entire media establishment. The coup of 
September 12th, 1980, Turkey’s third, was the 
first time that a military intervention was 
announced to the public via television. It also 
marks the beginning of the structural transfor-
16  The coalition government established on 31 
March 1975 by Süleyman Demirel, constituted of 
the right-wing political parties in the parliament, 
was later named the “First National Front 
Government.” The Second National Front 
Government was formed in 1977, again by Demirel, 
and remained in power until 1978. 
mation of the political and social life in the 
country that stretches to the present day. This 
period was characterised by attacks on 
opposition groups and a process of uniformisa-
tion where even the most benign form of 
dissent was prohibited and suppressed. The 
aim was to create a citizenry which was 
uncritical, non-interfering and ready to 
sacrifice their individuality in the name of the 
“nation.” The media, especially television, was 
the most important tool for arriving at this 
aim; indeed, it was used very effectively. In 
1983, the Communications High Council 
(Haberleşme Yüksek Kurulu-HYK), a hybrid 
civilian and military body, was established to 
oversee the communication policies of the 
government. This and similar bodies regulating 
different walks of social life consolidated the 
long reach of military tutelage over society.
1.4. THE ECONOMIC 
LIBERALISATION OF THE 1980s: 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
JOURNALISM INTO AN ECONOMIC 
SECTOR
The military regime established by the junta 
came to an end with the coming to power of 
the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi- 
ANAP) under the leadership of Turgut Özal 
after the national elections in 1983. This 
marked the beginning of the “economic 
liberalisation process” in Turkey. ANAP 
transformed the economy through free-market 
reforms. While political and social factors 
mainly shaped the media in the 1980s, “econo-
mical factors have become the determinant 
afterwards.”17 The private entrepreneurship 
encouraged by ANAP’s liberal economic 
17  E. Dağtaş, “Uniformity of Media in Turkey: 
Tabloid Journalism Accompanied by Racy Popular 
Culture,” Fifth International Congress on Culture 
and Development, Havana, 11-14 June 2007, p. 2.
Military regimes established after each coup d’état also 
sought to seize the entire media establishment. The coup of 
September 12th, 1980, Turkey’s third, was the first time that a 
military intervention was announced to the public via 
television. 
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media. Throughout this period, the highest 
ratings went to televised debates between 
public intellectuals who probed into the recent 
history of the country until the early hours of 
the morning. 
1.5. THE 1990s: A NEW MEDIA 
MODEL
Turkey’s economic transformation during the 
1980s gave rise to the emergence of very strong 
media holdings in the next decade. The big 
capital from these holdings into the media left 
no room for smaller or fringe media groups in 
the sector. The media holdings’ organic 
relationships with the political elite caused a 
cross monopolisation19 in the industry.20 The 
Polly Peck Group under the ownership of Asil 
Nadir was the first group to take the lead in 
monopolisation. On the other hand, the 
fastest growing media holding was Doğan 
Media Group, owned by Aydın Doğan. The 
result of this change had inevitable consequen-
ces for both print and broadcast media. On the 
press front, the rapid tabloidisation of 
newspapers in the 1980s and commercialisati-
on/deregulation of the media in the 1990s 
generated a tendency toward sensationalist 
journalism. After the adoption of new broad-
19  Cross monopolization refers to the situation 
where economically strong large companies 
investing in other sectors begin to own media 
organs in the interest of gaining prestige and 
political power rather than turning a profit.
20  Dağtaş, 2007, p. 3.
policies was also visible in the media industry, 
where companies entered into a bitter rivalry 
to dominate the market. This resulted in the 
transfer of media ownership from “journalist 
families” to giant corporations.18 
The launch of the first private television 
station, “Magic Box” (which was later rena-
med Star 1), in 1990 was a landmark event for 
mass communication in Turkey. Star 1 had to 
begin its broadcasting via satellite from 
Germany due to a constitutional prohibition on 
private broadcasting at the time. The company 
was able to circumvent Article 133 which 
established TRT’s monopoly over all broadcas-
ting activities, mainly because Ahmet Özal, 
the son of President Turgut Özal, was one of its 
shareholders. With an amendment to Article 
133 in 1993, state monopoly over broadcasting 
was abolished. In 1994, the Radio and Televisi-
on Law was adopted, providing the legal 
framework for private broadcasting. 
The launch of a private television station 
created a dynamic atmosphere and the 
emergence of a miscellany of actors. Many 
thematic channels, such as Kral TV (for music 
videos and entertainment), were the creations 
of Star TV. The increase in the number of 
private channels during the 1990s and the 
opening of the first private radio broadcasting 
outfit in 1992 engendered the diversification in 
Turkey’s media. Consequently, many issues 
that were previously considered taboo became 
open for debate. After the 1980 coup d’état, 
many hitherto repressed and silenced groups 
in society emerged in the forefront of Turkey’s 
public sphere, thanks to the dynamism of the 
18  Ş. Çağlar and S.Ç. Mengü, “Media Groups and 
their Market Shares in Turkey during 
Globalization”, Media and Global Divides, IAMCR 
World Congress, Stockholm, 20-25 July 2008 
(International Blind Review), available at: http://
www.eptic.com.br/arquivos/Revistas/vol.
XI,n2,2009/10-CakarMenguSebnemCaglar.pdf. 
Star 1 had to begin its broadcasting via satellite due to a 
constitutional prohibition on private broadcasting at the time. 
The company was able to circumvent Article 133 which 
established TRT’s monopoly over all broadcasting activities, 
mainly because Ahmet Özal, the son of President Turgut Özal, 
was one of its shareholders.
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casting legislation in 1994, the concentration 
of ownership in the media sector intensified 
and commercial media content increasingly be-
came more banal.21 Turkey’s media was once 
again not functioning as the “Fourth Estate” 
on two crucial issues: freedom of expression 
and freedom of access to information. 
At the end of the 1990s, the media that had long 
been controlled by the state had also become a 
tool of manipulation for private capital groups 
for their political and economic benefits in their 
relationship with governments. Having said 
that, as stated earlier, although the big media 
outlets have also entered into political 
alliances or conflicts, and have had common or  
conflicting economic interests with one other 
and with  governments, they have by and large  
shared a common mindset which rests on 
protecting the ‘state interest.’  The most 
important consequence of this media structure 
has been the “post-modern military coup” of 
28 February 1997, what many consider to be the 
fourth instance of military intervention in 
politics, though not followed by the establish-
ment of a military regime. Mainstream media 
organisations, prompted by Turkey’s military 
establishment, published fictitious news/
content on the rise of Islamism. This catalysed 
21  A. Aksoy and K. Robins, “Peripheral Vision: 
Cultural Industries and Cultural Identities in 
Turkey”, A 29/11 Environment and Planning (1997), 
p. 1937-1952, 1943.
public anxiety over the reach of the secularist 
regime and created public support for the 
toppling of the Welfare Path (Refah-Yol) 
coalition government between the Islamic 
conservative Welfare Party (Refah Partisi- RP) 
and the center right True Path Party (Doğru Yol 
Partisi- DP). At its monthly meeting in February, 
the National Security Council, an executive 
organ comprised of civilian and military leaders, 
‘advised’ RP leader Necmettin Erbakan to 
resign. The military’s message was clear; 
Erbakan would face a more direct military 
intervention had he not agreed to step down. 
The government was not the only target of the 
February 28th process. Cengiz Çandar and 
Mehmet Ali Birand, two well-known journa-
lists working for a mainstream media organ, 
also became targets of the fictitious news 
leaked by the chief of staff which alleged that 
they were on the payroll of the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (Partiya Kerkerên Kurdistan- 
PKK). Based on false documents fabricated by 
Çevik Bir, the general who was then the second 
in command of the Chief of Staff, allegedly 
based on the testimony of a PKK militant-
turned-informant, both journalists were 
labeled as “PKK agents” by the mainstream 
media, which did not feel the need to check the 
accuracy of the information leaked from the 
military. First Birand and later Çandar were 
fired by their media patrons in national daily 
Sabah,22 while a leading human rights activist 
also branded as a PKK agent survived an 
assassination attempt.23
22  For a detailed account by Cengiz Çandar of this 
process the names “Turkey’s Dreyfus Affair,” 
which is commonly known in Turkey as the “Andıç 
incident”, see H. Cemal, Türkiye’nin Asker Sorunu: 
Ey Asker Siyasete Karışma! (2010), p. 292-303.  
23  The PKK informant would years later deny that he 
ever made such statements in his testimony.
The government was not the only target of the February 28th 
process. Cengiz Çandar and Mehmet Ali Birand, two well-
known journalists also became targets of the fictitious news 
leaked by the chief of staff which alleged that they were on 
the payroll of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Kerkerên 
Kurdistan- PKK). 
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1.6. ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE 
RESTRUCTURING OF THE MEDIA 
SECTOR
Between November 2000 and February 2001, 
Turkey suffered one of the worst economic 
crises of its history. The downfall had serious 
repercussions for the media industry because 
some of the media companies had substantial 
investments in the banking sector. The 
bankruptcy of a number of large private banks 
showed that this “business-media-banking 
cycle is no longer operational” in Turkey.25 The 
banking crises eventually led to the Banking 
Regulation and Supervision Agency’s (Bankacı-
lık Denetleme ve Düzenleme Kurulu- BDDK) 
revocation of the banking licences of a number 
of business groups, which also owned media 
companies. The management of the bankrupt 
banks was taken over by the Saving Deposit 
Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta 
Fonu- TMSF) in 2004, making this agency a big 
player in the media industry.  
1.7. THE EU ACCESSION PROCESS 
AND THE MEDIA
The EU process, which accelerated with the 
acceptance of Turkey as a candidate country in 
1999, required the undertaking of reforms in 
the media sector as well as in the area of 
human rights. This implied not only fundamen-
tal changes in the legal framework of the 
25  Sümer, 2010, p. 115. 
The 1999 national elections resulted in the 
creation of a coalition government between 
the Democratic Leftist Party (Demokratik Sol 
Parti- DSP), Motherland Party (Anavatan 
Partisi- ANAP) and National Action Party 
(Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi- MHP). Meanwhile, 
RP had to contend with an internal schism 
between the “traditionalists” and the 
“reformists.” The reformist members, who 
defined themselves as “conservative democ-
rats,” founded the Justice and Development 
Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AK Party), 
which came to power in 2002. Notwithstan-
ding its roots in political Islam, AK Party 
formed a single-party government on the basis 
of a pro-EU agenda, which many considered to 
be an oxymoron both in Turkey and abroad. 
Indeed, since the foundation of the republic in 
Turkey “the depiction of Islam as ‘the other’ or 
as the symbol of ‘non-modern orientalness’ 
has always constituted the essential substan-
ce of the secular state’s very legitimacy.”24 AK 
Party’s pro-European stand suggested that 
the “historical mission” of the establishment 
in Turkey had been, in a way, “stolen.” This 
mission, defined by Atatürk himself and 
internalised by the society as “catching up 
with the level of modern contemporary 
civilisation” was no longer under the monopoly 
of the state’s establishment. This challenged 
the preconceptions of the establishment and 
the mainstream media, which has traditionally 
allied itself with the regime and its agents, 
namely the military and high bureaucracy.
24  Ü. Cizre, “Introduction: The Justice and 
Development Party: Making Choices, Revisions 
and Reversals Interactively”, in Ü. Cizre (ed.), 
Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making 
of the Justice and Development Party (2008), p. 8.
The downfall had serious repercussions for the media industry 
because some of the media companies had substantial 
investments in the banking sector. The Saving Deposit 
Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu- TMSF) 
took on management of the bankrupt banks which, made it a 
big player in the media industry.   
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country but also an overhaul of the prevalent 
mindset and dominant culture in the media. A 
crucial aspect of the democratisation process 
was the redesign of the relationship between 
the military and the civilian governments. The 
prominence and domination of the military in 
all walks of life and in the political structure of 
Turkey made the process of change a difficult 
one. The historical role attributed to the media 
in consolidating the influence of the army 
through “state-military correspondence” and 
reproducing the statist political culture made 
it one of the most critical actors of this political 
transition. The Turkish media, especially the 
mainstream media, was caught between the 
military-bureaucratic-judicial tutelage—
which depended on the media for the preserva-
tion of the official ideology and those seg-
ments of society which, as never before, began 
to demand a truly independent and impartial 
media. Meanwhile, the increasing pressure on 
the media from an ever globalised economy as 
well as by the EU’s acquis communitaire 
required Turkey to further open its media 
sector to foreign investment.
Second Section
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Media Landscape in Turkey 
Also, Turkish people perceive television as one 
of the most reliable sources of information.31  
According to recent data by the Advertisers’ 
Association, spending on advertising in Turkey 
rose by 36.3% in the first half of 2010 to 1.84 
billion TL (1.2 billion USD) and is expected to 
increase by more than 30% by the end of 2010. 
The total size of the advertising sector is likely 
to reach 3.7 billion TL by the end of the year.32 
Television’s share in the advertising market 
includes 55.59% of the advertising expenditure. 
The advertising shares of other media forums 
are as follows: print media (26.70%); outdoor 
(billboards and the like) (7.03%); internet 
(6.59%); radio (2.78%); and cinema (1.31%). 
31  Nalçaoğlu, 2010, p. 83.
32 Advertisers’ Association, 2010 Yılı İlk Dönem 
Medya Yatırımları, 06 August 2010, available at: 
http://www.finchannel.com/Main_News/
Business/69084_Turkey%3A_Advertising_
spending_rises_by_36.3_percent_in_first_half_
of_2010/ (last visited on 10 September 2010).
Turkey has a population of 74,816,000, the 
majority of which consists of young people; 
50% of the total population is under the age of 
28; thus, it has quite a young readership. The 
majority of readers are between the ages of 16 
and 34.26 According to the United Nations 
Development Programme, the rate of literacy 
in Turkey is 88.7%27 and in light of its total 
population, the rate of literacy is considered 
low. Although 60% of the people in Turkey do 
not read a newspaper regularly, 90% watch TV 
on a daily basis.28 Turkey, with 5 hours of daily 
viewing, has one of the largest TV audiences in 
the world.29 According to a report which 
measured TV viewing during the first three 
months of 2009, serials and day-time cooking 
shows are the most popular programs among 
the Turkish people.30 News channels and 
discussion programs have high ratings as well. 
26  R. Barış, “The Turkish Media Landscape,” in G. 
Terzis (ed.) European Media Governance: National 
and Regional Dimensions (2005), p. 289-302.
27  United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
“Adult Literacy Rate” (2007), available at: http://
hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/89.html (last 
visited on 9 October 2010).
28  H. Nalçaoğlu, Türkiye’yi Anlama Kılavuzu: 
Türkiye’de Yaşam Tarzları ve Eğilimler, Ipsos KMG 
(2010), p. 83.      
29  G. Terzis, “Editor’s Preface,” in G. Terzis (ed.) 
European Media Governance: National and 
Regional Dimensions (2005), p. 14. 
30  Radio and Television Supreme Council (Radyo ve 
Televizyon Üst Kurulu - RTÜK), Radyo ve Televizyon 
Üst Kuruluna Gelen Bildirimlerin 2007-2008 ve 2009 
Yıllarının İlk Üç Aylık Dönemlerinin Karşılaştırması 
ve 2009 Yılı Genel Değerlendirmesi, 27 May 2009, 
available at: http://www.dorduncukuvvetmedya.
com/rtukun-arastirmasi-izleyici-en-cok-hangi-
programlari-izliyor.html (last visited on 12 
September 2010).
Cinema
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Outdoor
Print Media
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1%
3%
7%
23%
55%
7%
The Advertising Shares of Media Forums
Source: Advertiser’s Association, 2010 First Quarter Investments on Media, (2010).
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stake in the cinema and advertising industries 
through D Productions. Channel Romania D is 
another investment of the group in Romania. 
The group also includes Doğan Burda Rizzoli 
(DBR), a joint venture with the German 
publishing house Burda and the Italian media 
corporation Rizzoli.33 Doğan runs its own news 
agency, DHA, publishing house, Doğan Kitap, 
and merchandising company, D&R.  
Zaman has been the most circulated daily 
paper in Turkey since 1986. It is also published 
internationally in Australia, the United States, 
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Germany, Romania, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, and 
Turkmenistan. It has an English daily called 
Today’s Zaman. Both papers are owned by the 
Feza Group. In 1994, the group also launched 
its own news agency, Cihan, and weekly 
magazine, Aksiyon. Feza has a partnership 
agreement with Samanyolu Group. Both 
groups are affiliated with the Fethullah Gülen 
movement, an extremely well organized and 
close-knit Muslim conservative community 
which operates Turkish instruction schools 
and universities and has investments across 
the world.
Doğuş Media Group was founded in 1999. Its 
first channel was the news channel, NTV. In 
addition, the group collaborates with interna-
tional brands such as CNBC, NBA, Billboard, 
Virgin, and National Geographic.
The Albayrak Group was established in 1952. 
Until 1982, it was active only in the constructi-
on sector. The group began publishing the 
daily Yeni Şafak in 1995.34 Having liberal and 
left-wing columnists who do not belong to the 
33  These three media groups together publish 22 
magazines in Turkey. Barış, 2005, p. 291.
34  ESI, Turkey – Armenia Manual: Information and 
Contacts to Persons and Institutions Working on 
Turkey-Armenia Relations (2010), p. 62.
There are 33 communication faculties in Turkey 
with around 21,000 students. Since 2008, 
students in Turkey are being given media 
education starting in primary school.
2.1. PRINT & BROADCAST MEDIA 
The media sector in Turkey is divided into 
aggregations. The biggest eight of the 15 
media groups are Albayrak, Doğan, Çukurova, 
Ciner, Çalık, Feza, Doğuş and İhlas Groups. All 
major private television and radio stations, 
newspapers and periodicals belong to these 
groups. The Doğan Media Group and Merkez 
Group also have a monopoly over the distribu-
tion of the print media through Yay-Sat and 
MDP, respectively. 
All major private television and radio stations, newspapers and 
periodicals belong to the biggest eight media groups in Turkey. 
The Doğan Media Group and Merkez Group also have a 
monopoly over the distribution of the print media through 
Yay-Sat and MDP, respectively. 
Established in 1980, Doğan Media Group is the 
largest media holding company in Turkey. The 
group has eight dailies: Hürriyet, Milliyet, 
Radikal, Posta, Vatan, Fanatik, Referans and 
Hürriyet Daily News. Hürriyet and Milliyet have a 
nationalist and statist position while Radikal 
has a social-democrat point of view. Posta is a 
tabloid newspaper and Referans was a 
financial newspaper that has recently been 
merged with Radikal. Doğan Media Group also 
owns the national TV channels Kanal D, Star 
and CNN Turk and radio channels Radio D, Slow 
Turk Radio and Radio Moda. The group also 
owns a digital platform called D-Smart, which 
includes many thematic and pay-per-view 
channels. Moreover, the group provides access 
for all TV channels on Türksat satellite. It has a 
31
national, 23 regional and 2,381 local.37 It is the 
national papers with a daily circulation of 4.5-5 
million that have the highest readership. 
Among the national dailies, according to their 
average weekly sales, Zaman (651,072), Posta 
(485,971), Hürriyet (440,345), Sabah (371,007) 
Habertürk (255,423) and Sözcü (232,812) are the 
major ones.38 Istanbul and Ankara are the 
media centers of Turkey. The headquarters of 
all of the national newspapers and broadcas-
ting companies are located in these two cities. 
On the other hand, Izmir, the western port city 
of Turkey, is the only city that has a regional 
newspaper, Yeni Asır, which is known at the 
national level. 
37 Medyaradar, Türkiye’de Kaç Gazete ve Televizyon 
Var?, 1 October 2008, available at: http://www.
medyaradar.com/haber/gundem-21476/
turkiyedeki--gazete--televizyon--radyo-ve-
dergi-sayisi-ne-kadar--peki-kac-iletisim-
fakultesi-var--iste-cok-ilginc-rakamlar.html (last 
visited on 10 September 2010). 
38  Dördüncükuvvetmedya, Geçtiğimiz Haftanın 
Gazete Tirajları Belli Oldu,  available at: http://
www.dorduncukuvvetmedya.com/gectigimiz-
haftanin-gazete-satis-rakamlari-belli-oldu.html 
(last visited on 10 October 2010).
Islamic community the paper has emerged 
from, Yeni Şafak “offers a relatively broader 
perspective especially about the controversial 
issues.”35 Since 2007 it has been running 
TVNET, a news channel. 
Ciner Holding was an active company in the 
automotive and energy sectors under the 
name of Park Holding. In 2002, the company 
entered the media sector. In September 2007 
Ciner Publishing Holding was founded; it 
currently owns Habertürk.com, Habertürk 
Radyo, Habertürk TV, Ajans Habertürk and 
Gazete Habertürk. The company holds interna-
tional TV and radio channels such as Bloom-
berg TV and Bloomberg HT Radyo. The Turkish 
language editions of Marie Claire and Maison, 
belong to Ciner Group  as does the recently clo-
sed Newsweek, FHM, Food and Travel, GEO, and 
Mother and Baby.
Çukurova Holding currently publishes the 
Akşam, Güneş, Tercüman newspapers and Alem 
magazine and owns the Show and Sky Turk TV 
stations. Turkcell, the leader in the GSM 
industry, as well as Digiturk, which broadcasts 
the national football league matches, also 
belong to this group.
The Turkuvaz Group belongs to Çalık Holding. 
In December 2007 the group bought the 
Merkez Medya Group from Ciner Holding and 
became the proprietors of the newspapers Yeni 
Asır (Izmir), Sabah, Takvim, Günaydın and Pas 
Fotomac, the weeklies Bebeğim ve Biz, Sinema, 
Home Art, Yeni Aktuel and Gobal Enerji, as well 
as the television station ATV.36
According to BYEGM, as of 2008, there are 
2,459 newspapers in Turkey, 55 of which are 
35 Barış, 2005, p. 291.
36  ESI, 2010, p. 63.
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classical, folk and pop music), Radyo 3 (prima-
rily Western classical music and also jazz, 
polyphonic and western pop music, broadcasts 
news in English, French and German), Radyo 4 
(Turkish folk and traditional music), TRT 6 
(regional and international themes) and TRT 
Nagme and TRT Türkü (traditional Turkish and 
folk music on both the national and internatio-
nal level). TRT’s first international radio 
service The Voice of Turkey (Türkiye‘nin Sesi) 
broadcasts in 32 languages and, since July 
2009, Türkiye Avrupa FM carries Turkey’s 
national news to the Turkish population in 
Europe.  TRT also has six regional and one 
local radio stations. 
Finally, there are 14 weeklies with an approxi-
mate circulation of 110,000 copies combined. 
Of these, Aksiyon (Feza Group), Yeni Aktüel 
(Turkuvaz Group), Newsweek and Economist 
have the highest circulation. The circulation of 
the weeklies is quite low compared with that of 
the dailies.   
2.2. NEWS AGENCIES
There are a total of 24 news agencies in Turkey. 
The official news agency, Anadolu Agency 
(Anadolu Ajansı - AA), in operation since 1920, 
is the oldest among them and continues to be 
the primary news source for the press. It has 41 
offices in Turkey and 26 abroad.41  Doğan News 
Agency (Doğan Haber Ajansı- DHA) is the news 
agency of Doğan Holding and was founded in 
1999. It has 30 domestic and 19 international 
offices. The Feza Group has Cihan News 
Agency (Cihan Haber Ajansı) which was 
established in 1994. It has six domestic offices. 
It provides an average of 450 text stories, 400 
photos, 180 photo stories and 85 video stories 
per day. Cihan also provides news and services 
41  Barış, 2005, p. 295.
BYEGM reports that, as of 2008, the total num-
ber of television channels in Turkey is 258, of 
which 27 are national, 16 regional and 215 local. 
65 of these channels are available on cable and 
92 on satellite.39 The multimedia groups are the 
main actors in the private broadcasting 
market. According to the ratings of September 
2010, Kanal D, ATV, NTV, CNN Türk and 
Habertürk are the top five heading the list.40 
Public broadcaster TRT has 13 television 
channels. The national ones are as follows: 
TRT 1 (general), TRT 3 (National Grand 
Assembly at specific hours), TRT Kid, TRT News, 
TRT Documentary, TRT Sports, TRT HD and TRT 
Music. TRT also has two regional—TRT 
5-Anadolu and TRT GAP—and four internatio-
nal channels—TRT Turk for Europe, USA and 
Australia; TRT-AVRASYA for Middle Asia and 
the Caucasus, TRT Avaz for the Balkan 
countries, Central Asia, the Middle East and 
the Caucasus and, since April 2010, TRT- ET-
TURKIYYE for the Arab world. The most 
significant change concerning public broadcas-
ter TRT in the EU accession process has been 
the launch of 24-hour Kurdish language 
broadcasting on January 1st, 2009. TRT 6 
became the first TRT channel ever to broad-
cast exclusively in a language other than 
Turkish.
There are currently approximately 1,087 private 
radio channels broadcasting in Turkey; 100 of 
these are also available on cable. Of these, 36 
are national, 100 regional and 951 are local 
radio stations. TRT has six national radio 
channels with different broadcasting themes: 
Radyo 1 (general), Radyo 2 (TRT-FM, native 
39  Medyaradar.
40  Gazeteciler.com, Eylül Ayının en çok İzlenen 
Kanalları, 01 October 2010,  available at:  http://
www.gazeteciler.com/rating/eylul-ayinin-en-
cok-izlenen-kanali-hangisi-oldu-23355h.html 
(last visited on 10 October 2010).
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internet is mostly used for the purpose of 
sending e-mails and shopping.43 Internet cafes 
played a massive role in the proliferation of the 
internet in Turkey. 
Turkey’s television and radio broadcasters’ 
increasing use of online services, the prolifera-
tion of online daily newspapers, political 
parties’ and politicians’ accessibility via e-mail, 
and people’s increased awareness about the 
internet reveals the speed and breadth of 
43 Turkish Statistical Institute, Hanehalkı Bilişim 
Teknolojileri Kullanım Araştırması, 18 August 2010, 
available at:  http://www.socialmediatr.com/
blog/tuikin-2010-yili-hanehalki-bilisim-
teknolojileri-kullanim-arastirmasi-sonuclandi 
(last visited on 12 October 2010).       
in English and Arabic.42 İhlas News Agency 
(İhlas Haber Ajansı- İHA) is owned by İhlas 
Holding. It has 145 offices in Turkey and 
abroad. Dicle News Agency (Dicle Haber 
Ajansı- DİHA) was founded in 2002. Based in 
Istanbul, it has five other offices in Turkey and 
one in Iraqi Kurdistan. DIHA offers news in 
Turkish, Kurdish and occasionally in English.  
2.3. ONLINE MEDIA 
The internet emerged in Turkey in 1993, first on 
university campuses and soon thereafter in 
offices, businesses and homes. According to 
the Turkish Statistical Institute’s survey in 
April 2010, household internet use increased 
from 30 to 41.6% within one year. Men 
between the ages of 16-74 amount to 53.4% of 
the total population of internet users while 
women have a rate of use of 33.2%. The 
42  Ibid.
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The internet emerged in Turkey in 1993 and first used in 
university campuses. 
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an minority has four newspapers: Jamanak, 
Marmara, Lraper and Agos. Jamanak is the 
oldest, in publication since 1908; Marmara is 
the second oldest, begun in 1940. Published six 
times a week, the Friday edition of Marmara 
contains a section in Turkish. Its circulation is 
around 1,500. Half of the subscriptions are sent 
abroad to the Turkish Armenian diaspora 
around the world. Lraper is the news bulletin of 
the Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul, 
published in Armenian, Turkish and English. 
Agos is the only example of a minority paper 
that reaches broader segments of society. 
Originally established with the goal of 
breaking the barriers between the Armenian 
and Turkish communities in Turkey, it is 
published predominantly in Turkish with only a 
few pages in Armenian. Following the assassi-
nation of Editor in Chief Hrant Dink in 2007, 
the paper increased its efforts to reach out to 
the broader public by increasing the number of 
its pages in Turkish, employing new columnists 
from outside the Armenian community and 
adding new sections. The paper is popular 
among dissident political groups as well as 
those who want to support the paper as a form 
of protest against Dink’s murder. It has 
Armenian, Greek-Orthodox, Turkish, Kurdish, 
Sunni and Alevi staff members and columnists. 
Agos began with a circulation of 2,000. By the 
time of Hrant Dink’s death it had grown to 
approximately 6,000. Dink’s successor until 
June 2010 was Etyen Mahçupyan, a reputable 
public intellectual. He was succeeded by Rober 
Koptaş, who had been a columnist at the paper 
since the 1990s. 
Aras Publishing is the only Armenian publis-
hing house in Turkey. It was founded in 1993 by 
a group of Istanbul Armenians. It has now 
established itself as one of the few publishing 
houses producing works in two languages, 
Turkish and Armenian. Aras intends to 
internet development in Turkey. However, 
internet and cell phone usage is still very 
limited and highly expensive for most people. 
The rate of internet use differs significantly 
from region to region. While internet use is 
very high in the central-west parts of Turkey, it 
declines towards the central-east. In general, 
the use of the internet for news, research and 
educational purposes is lower compared to its 
use for entertainment purposes (game, 
pornographic and social networking sites).
The use of social networking sites is limited 
due to the lack of the requisite technological 
infrastructure, yet it is quite popular, especi-
ally among the young. The use of mobile 
phones for access to social networking sites is 
higher than for the internet, again, particularly 
among the youth. Facebook, twitter and 
personal blogs are the most common social 
networking sites. 
2.4. MINORITY AND ALTERNATIVE 
MEDIA 
There are few, yet quite well-established, 
minority newspapers run by non-Muslim and 
Kurdish communities in Turkey. The daily Iho 
and the weekly Apoyevmatini address the 
Greek Orthodox community in Istanbul. 
Apoyevmatini began publication as a daily in 
1925 and has subsequently become a weekly. 
Today it publishes 580 copies per week, 550 of 
which are delivered to Greek families in 
Istanbul. Its editor-in-chief is Mihail Vasiliadis. 
Iho began publication in 1977. The Jewish 
weekly Şalom was established in 1947. It was 
published in Ladino until the 1980s. When 
Ladino could no longer be understood by the 
new generation of Jews, the paper switched to 
Turkish, leaving only one page in Ladino. It has 
a circulation of nearly 3,500 and has 500 
subscribers abroad. It has a large staff with 40 
columnists and 15 staff members. The Armeni-
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Although its circulation is relatively low 
compared to the mainstream circulation, the 
paper has dominated Turkey’s political agenda 
ever since it was launched in 2007 through 
publishing confidential documents seemingly 
leaked by military personnel. These leaks 
revealed a series of failed coup attempts by 
senior military leaders against the AK Party 
government.
Bianet, or BIA, is an online news portal which 
was initiated as a project in 2003 with the 
support of the European Union’s Initiative for 
Democracy and Human Rights. The purpose of 
the project was to establish a countrywide 
network in Turkey for monitoring and covering 
media freedom and independent journalism. 
BIA monitors the coverage of human rights 
issues in the mainstream media, extensively 
covers women’s and children’s rights and 
monitors the media’s compliance with the 
ethical codes of the profession.44
Açık Radyo went on air in 1995 and is an 
exceptionally independent channel outside of 
the media establishment. It is a collective 
where all shareholders have equal shares, 
similar to the model of national public broad-
casters in the United States. Its programming 
is based on citizen/audience participation and 
it relies on the donations of its listeners 
collected through biannual drives broadcasted 
live. Açık Radyo is a defender of the environ-
mentalist movement in Turkey and has a 
multi-cultural and liberal stance.   
44 Barış, 2005, p. 299.
preserve the cultural legacy of Turkey’s 
Armenians for future generations.
Azadiya Welat is the only daily published in 
Kurdish. Following a 1991 law that lifted the 
ban on the speaking and writing of the Kurdish 
language, the weekly Welat was launched in 
Istanbul in 1992. Subsequently closed down by 
the courts, the weekly changed its name to 
Azadiya Welat in 1996. It has been publishing 
since that time, albeit with interruptions due 
to court-imposed bans. In 2003, the paper 
moved its headquarters from Istanbul to 
Diyarbakır and in 2006 became a daily. The 
paper is distributed across the country and has 
a circulation between 4,000 and 10,000. 
Apart from the minority media, there are a few 
examples of alternative media organs that are 
not owned by a large media group and that 
emphasize objectivity and impartiality in news 
reporting as well as independence from the 
state, military, the media big business as well 
as any other power structure. The most 
notable alternative media organs are the daily 
Taraf, the online Bianet and Açık Radyo. 
Taraf is owned by Alkım Kitapevi, a bookshop 
chain which is not a part of the multimedia 
outlets. Although praised in Islamist circles, 
Taraf’s stance can be described as neither 
pro-AK Party, nor pro-Islam, but anti-military. 
The paper’s daring and harsh reporting against 
the military led to the chief of staff’s cancella-
tion of the paper’s accreditation for entry into 
press meetings organised at the headquarters 
of the armed forces. While the newspaper is 
sympathetic to AK Party circles, it has also 
criticised the government harshly, particularly 
on the Kurdish question, freedom of the press 
and police brutality. The columnists writing for 
the paper are a broad coalition of secular and 
atheist intellectuals, many with leftist and 
democrat backgrounds, as well as religious 
individuals from the Islamic community. 
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actors that develop policies for the media and 
(self) regulate the sector: executive bodies, 
independent regulatory agencies, and 
self-regulatory professional media organizati-
ons. While all three are briefly outlined in this 
section, the mandates and powers of the first 
two are discussed in the next section on 
structural regulation.
At the executive level, the Ministry of Trans-
portation is responsible for regulating the 
internet; there is a ministry of state in charge 
of radio and television, which also has 
competence over the Radio and Television 
Supreme Council (Radyo Televizyon Üst 
Kurulu-RTÜK); BYEGM under the Office of the 
Prime Ministry has mandate over the press, 
including the accreditation of the press for the 
purposes of liaising with the government; and 
HYK, a body made up of civilian and military 
officials, is tasked with the oversight and 
approval of the government’s communication 
policies. 
The Information and Communication Techno-
logies Authority (Bilgi Teknolojileri ve İletişim 
Kurumu- BTK) is an independent agency 
responsible for regulating the internet and 
mobile communication. BTK’s equivalent in the 
The globalisation of the 1990s, the banking 
crisis of 2000-2001 and the EU accession 
process in the 2000s brought about a restruc-
turing of the media sector on the one hand and 
the adoption of reforms to enhance media 
independence, pluralism and freedom on the 
other. While globalization exposed the Turkish 
media to foreign investment, the bankruptcy of 
banks which also owned media companies 
resulted in over-regulation and the emergence 
of administrative bodies as new key players in 
the sector. These developments resulted in the 
redesign of the structural and ownership 
regulations governing the media as well as the 
multiplicity of the media policy and regulatory 
institutions. Successive governments since 
1999, when Turkey was officially declared a 
candidate for EU accession, sought to harmo-
nise the national legal framework with 
European standards without compromising 
the official state ideology and losing the 
government’s control over the media. The 
attempts to achieve these mutually exclusive 
goals have created tensions and contradictions 
in the design and implementation of media 
policies, which have been a characteristic 
feature of Turkey’s reform process in recent 
years.
3.1. ACTORS OF MEDIA POLICY 
AND REGULATION
The multiplicity of the media policy and 
regulatory institutions in Turkey may at times 
create confusion over their competences and 
mandates. There are three principal types of 
Successive governments since 1999, when Turkey was officially 
declared a candidate for EU accession, sought to harmonise 
the national legal framework with European standards 
without compromising the official state ideology and losing the 
government’s control over the media. 
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mainstream media members. It has members 
from the Doğan media group as well as from 
the republican newspaper Cumhuriyet. The 
Progressive Journalists Association was 
founded by the leftist media members. The 
Foundation of Journalists and Writers has a 
religious identity and the Association of the 
Media was founded by journalists who are 
supportive of the AK Party government. The 
Press Council, on the other hand, is entirely the 
construction of the Doğan media group. None 
of these associations have the capacity, ability 
or will to contribute meaningfully to the 
development of media policy in Turkey. 
3.2. STRUCTURAL REGULATION 
There are a number of principal laws that 
regulate the structure and content of the 
media in Turkey, all of which have been revised 
and/or re-enacted within the past decade: Law 
no. 5187 on the print media (“Press Law”); Law 
no. 6112 on private radio and television 
broadcasting (“Broadcasting Law”); Law no. 
2954 on public broadcasting (“TRT Law”); Law 
no. 5651 on internet and mobile communicati-
on (“Internet Law”); and Law no. 5809 on 
electronic communications (“Electronic 
Communications Law”).
3.2.1. Licensing Rules
As stated earlier, until 1993, there was a 
constitutional ban on private broadcasting in 
Turkey. State broadcaster TRT’s monopoly over 
broadcasting was de facto terminated in 1990 
with the launch of the STAR 1 TV channel, 
which broadcasted via satellite from Europe. 
With the emergence of hundreds of private 
broadcasting companies within a matter of a 
few years, a chaotic situation emerged in the 
absence of any legal framework to regulate the 
market. To provide a legal basis to this de facto 
situation, the constitutional ban on private 
broadcasting was abolished in 1993, followed 
broadcasting sector is RTÜK, an independent 
agency in charge of regulating private radio 
and televisions. 
There are few independent bodies that monitor 
the media from within the profession. The 
Turkish Press Council (Basın Konseyi), establis-
hed with the initiative of a group of journalists 
in 1998 for self-regulation of the press and for 
ensuring its compliance with professional 
ethical rules and codes of conduct, is a 
contentious body whose autonomy from state 
ideology is widely contested by members of 
the profession. In recent years, newspapers 
have begun selecting ombudsmen among their 
columnists or editors to respond to readers’ 
concerns and critiques and to monitor the 
compliance of their paper with the ethical rules 
of journalism. However, newspapers exempt 
from ombudsmen mandate their website 
editions, some of which are criticised by human 
rights groups for their discriminatory content, 
particularly against women and minorities. 
The primary journalist associations in Turkey 
are: The Journalists Association of Turkey 
(Türkiye Gazeteciler Cemiyeti), the Journalists’ 
Federation of Turkey (Türkiye Gazeteciler 
Federasyonu), the Progressive Journalists 
Association (Çağdaş Gazeteciler Derneği), the 
Foundation of Journalists and Writers (Gazete-
ciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı), the Association of the 
Media (Medya Derneği), the Association of 
Economy Reporters (Ekonomi Muhabirleri 
Derneği), the Association of Photo Reporters 
(Foto Muhabirleri Derneği), the Association of 
Parliamentary Reporters (Parlamento Muhabir-
leri Derneği) and the Press Council (Basın 
Konseyi). There are two journalist unions called 
Union of Journalists in Turkey (Türkiye 
Gazeteciler Sendikası-TGS) and Media Union 
(MEDYA-SEN) but their prominence is low.  
The Journalists Association of Turkey repre-
sents the central and statist tendencies of the 
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Though established primarily as a regulatory 
body to assign broadcasting frequencies, 
RTÜK has not been able to perform this 
function as of today. Initially, following the 
enactment of the Broadcasting Law, provisio-
nal licenses were issued to broadcasters. The 
agency’s repeated attempts in the mid-1990s 
onwards to complete frequency allocations 
failed due to the interference of the National 
Security Council, opposition by broadcasting 
companies, court orders and political battles 
in parliament.49 As part of the restructuring of 
telecommunications services and in order to 
facilitate the allocation of frequencies, in 2002, 
HYK and Türk Telekom were made partners of 
RTÜK and frequency planning was included 
within Türk Telekom’s mandate. However, this 
endeavour “has been unsuccessful mainly due 
to discordance among these regulatory bodies 
and the pressure of the media 
conglomerates.”50 The commencement of 
frequency auctions was halted due to the 
government’s “fear of retaliation by the media 
giants” and the National Security Council’s 
intervention “to oblige broadcasters to acquire 
a national security clearance document which 
would supposedly prevent the establishment 
of religious TV channels.”51 Following the 
amendment of the Broadcasting Law in 2002, 
the government issued permanent licenses to 
49  For a detailed discussion, see Sümer, 2010, p. 
113-115 and 118-125.
50  Ibid., p. 295-296.
51  Ibid., p. 296.
in 1994 by the adoption of the Broadcasting 
Law (no. 3984),45 which replaced the 1983 law 
(no. 2954). The name of the regulatory body 
was changed from the “Radio and Television 
High Council” to the “Radio and Television 
Supreme Council”. 
RTÜK was established in 1994 for regulating 
private broadcasters as well as for monitoring 
their compliance with the Broadcasting Law. 
Its main regulatory function was to issue 
broadcasting permits and licences and assign 
frequencies. Its monitoring function entails 
enforcement powers against private broadcas-
ters that do not comply with the law. Since the 
2000s,46 RTÜK’s mandate does not extend to 
TRT, which is subject to a separate law, no. 
2954, which applies solely to public 
broadcasting.47 The nine members of RTÜK are 
elected by parliament among candidates 
nominated by political parties represented in 
parliament. Individuals related to RTÜK 
members up to the 3rd degree cannot be 
shareholders, managers or partners of radio 
and television companies. While RTÜK defines 
itself as “an autonomous and impartial” public 
body,48 its political composition has been a 
matter of contention for a long time. The 
second ground for criticisms against RTÜK is 
the punitive power it has been equipped with 
in monitoring private broadcasters’ complian-
ce with the law. This will be discussed in detail 
below in the section on content regulation.
45  Law no. 3984 was replaced by law no. 6112 in 
February 2011. See below for more on the new 
Broadcasting Law. 
46  TRT was governed under the Broadcasting Law 
until the 2000s. 
47  Barış, 2005, p. 295.
48  Website of RTÜK, available at: http://www.rtuk.
org.tr/sayfalar/IcerikGoster.aspx?icerik_
id=80775e05-caec-4a48-bac5-39fd6375da3b (last 
visited on 08 October 2010).      
In 1994, the government issued permanent licenses to the  
23 broadcasters which had been given temporary licenses for 
national broadcasting, but could not allocate frequencies to any 
additional firm. The purchase of one of the existing radio and/or 
television stations became the only means of entry into the field. 
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for consumer protection.53 BTK is also tasked 
with aligning Turkey’s legal framework with 
that of the EU regarding authorisation, 
spectrum management, access and intercon-
nection, numbering, number portability, rights 
of way, and tariffs. Towards that end, the 
agency introduced a strategic plan for 2010-
2012.  Yet, the EU has found the primary law 
and implementing regulations governing the 
telecommunications sector to fall short of the 
standards laid out in its acquis. In its 2010 
Progress Report on Turkey, the European 
Commission noted that BTK’s authorisation 
procedures “confer a margin of discretion on 
the regulator that could lead to legal unpredic-
tability” and criticized Turkey’s legal frame-
work for failing to ensure transparency and the 
independence of the regulatory authority.54 
Presided by the prime minister or a minister 
appointed by him, the HYK is made up of the 
ministers of interior and transportation, a high 
level representative from the chief of staff, the 
general secretary of the National Security 
Council and the undersecretary of the National 
Intelligence Agency. It meets biannually to 
review and approve communications policies. 
The Telecommunication Authority (Türk 
Telekom), established after the separation in 
1995 of postal and telecommunications 
services hitherto provided by the PTT and 
privatised in 2005, is Turkey’s telecom 
operator in charge of providing telecommuni-
cations services. All telecommunications 
activity in Turkey is regulated under the 
Telecommunications Law (Law no. 406), which 
53  Information and Communication Technologies 
Authority (Bilgi Teknolojileri ve İletişim Kurumu 
– BTK).      
54  European Commission, Turkey 2010 Progress 
Report, 9 November 2010, p. 56, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/
key-documents/reports_nov_2008_en.htm.
the 23 broadcasters which had been given tem-
porary licenses for national broadcasting in 
1994, but could not allocate frequencies to any 
additional firm. This has precluded the entry of 
new players in the broadcasting market, 
leaving the purchase of one of the existing 
radio and/or television stations as the only me-
ans of entry into the field. 
The new Broadcasting Law, no. 6112 and 
adopted in February 2011, seeks to address this 
decades-old deadlock.52 The law assigned the 
task of frequency allocation back to RTÜK and 
prioritizes the existing broadcasters in the 
allocation of frequencies, which will be 
completed within two years after the law’s 
entry into force.
Whereas RTÜK is tasked with assigning 
frequencies, BTK undertakes frequency 
planning. In accordance with its competences 
outlined in Law no. 5809, BTK is also tasked 
with advising the Ministry of Transportation 
on planning the telecommunications sector; 
following the new developments in technology 
and providing support for domestic companies 
in the production of technology; ensuring free 
competition in the provision of goods and 
services in the market; and defining and 
implementing performance standards for the 
manufacturing of systems and equipment to 
be used in the telecommunications sector. 
Tasked with monitoring compliance with the 
Broadcasting Law, BTK has the power to notify 
relevant bodies on non-compliance and 
impose sanctions where required; ban access 
to the internet on grounds, inter alia, of 
obscenity and child abuse; and take measures 
52  Law on the Establishment and Broadcasting 
Services of Radio and Televisions (Radyo ve 
Televizyonların Kuruluş ve Yayın Hizmetleri 
Hakkında Kanun), no. 6112, 15 February 2011, 
Official Gazette no. 27863, 3 March 2011.
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high taxation on communication services that 
are not related to administrative costs; the 
lack of independence of RTÜK and TRT and 
lack of adequate public funding for these two 
agencies; the failure of RTÜK to undertake 
reallocating frequencies and issuing licences; 
and the near monopoly of Türk Telekom as the 
service provider for the internet. In 2009 alone, 
more than a dozen TV channels were shut 
down by RTÜK on the grounds of operating 
without licences, notwithstanding that they 
had applied to receive broadcasting licences 
years before.58 Law no. 6112 was enacted in 
February 2011 partially with the purpose of 
remedying the national law’s incompatibility 
with the EU law. Prepared on the basis of the 
EU’s Directive on Audiovisual Media Services, 
the law introduces a new concept of broadcas-
ting and paves the way for the switchover to 
digital broadcasting, a process which had been 
halted due to internal rifts between the public 
broadcaster TRT and private broadcasters.59 
The law replaced the terms “radio” and 
“television” with “media service providers” and 
introduced “services upon demand” as a new 
category. Critics60 find these new concepts and 
the law’s mandate to be ambiguous.61 
58  European Commission, Turkey 2009 Progress 
Report, 14 October 2009, available at: http://
ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/
key-documents/reports_oct_2009_en.htm (last 
visited on 1 December 2010), p. 52.
59  Sümer, 2010, p. 144.
60  For an example of such critiques, see the 
assessment report by the Association of 
Communication Research (İletişim Araştırmaları 
Derneği- İLAD), available at:  http://www.
iletisimarastirma.org/haberler/71-rtuk-kanun-
tasarisi-taslagi-degerlendirme-raporu.html (last 
visited on 29 March 2011).
61  Specifically, the term ‘media service providers’ 
goes beyond radio and television broadcasting, 
which is what the law regulates, and connotes 
other media such as the internet. Critiques argue 
that the appropriate term should be ‘audio-visual 
broadcasting.’ 
was amended in 2000 and 2001 in order to 
modernise the provision of services and 
improve the infrastructure. In 2004 and 2005, 
the power to provide satellite communication 
services and the services provided over cable 
TV has been transferred from Türk Telekom to 
Türksat Uydu Haberleşme Kablo TV, which was 
established in 2004.55 The privatisation of Türk 
Telekom was finalised in 2005 with the sale of 
55% of its shares to Oger Telecoms Joint 
Venture Group. Although the market was thus 
opened for competition through the privatiza-
tion of Türk Telekom, obstacles for entry of new 
players remain. In fact, currently, Türk Telekom 
has a near monopoly over service provision of 
the internet, controlling more than 95% of the 
market.56 
The financial crisis of 2000-1 and the bank-
ruptcy of a number of big banks which had 
investments in print and broadcasting media 
resulted in the emergence of a new regulatory 
framework and regulatory agencies in the 
sector. BDDK, TMSF and Competition Agency 
(Rekabet Kurulu) emerged as big players in the 
media, which has increasingly been regulated 
under the anti-competition law.57 
Turkey’s structural regulatory framework is 
still far from being aligned with the EU’s acquis 
on audiovisual policy, in particular the 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive. Among 
the outstanding issues are the following: very 
55  The amendments were made pursuant to Law no. 
5189 of 16 June 2004 and Law no. 5335 of 21 April 
2005 Official Gazette no. 25798, 27 April 2005, 
http://www.turktelekom.com.tr/tt/portal/
About-TT/Company-Profile/Legal/.
56  European Commission, Turkey 2008 Progress 
Report, 05 November 2008, available at: http://
ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/
key-documents/reports_nov_2008_en.htm  (last 
visited on 1 December 2010), p. 50.
57  C. Sözeri, “Türkiye’de Medya Sektöründe 
Uluslararası Şirket Birleşmeleri,” unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, Marmara University (2009), p. 131.
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annual average ratio of viewing or listening 
was above 20%. The cap on shares of foreign 
enterprises would be increased from 20% to 
25% through a late night amendment to the 
law as a result of intense lobbying by broad-
casting companies.66 The most controversial 
aspect of the amendments was the planned 
lifting of the ban on shareholders who owned 
more than 10% shares in any private broadcas-
ting company from entering into public tenders 
and investing in the stock market. This was the 
outcome of years of intense lobbying by media 
conglomerates, in particular the Doğan media 
group.67 Finally, the proposed changes to the 
law would substantially change the compositi-
on of RTÜK, whereby the role of parliament 
would be reduced in favour of bureaucratic 
institutions such as the National Security 
Council in nominating members to the agency. 
The amendments were criticized by the 
opponents of cross-monopolization, who 
pointed out that the 20% audience ratio was 
unrealistic since none of the private broadcas-
ters could reach that target.68 They argued 
that the law would facilitate rather than 
diminish monopolization in the media.69 
Although provisions of the law concerning the 
appointments of RTÜK’s members and the cap 
on shares owned by broadcasting corporations 
were vetoed by the president, the parliament 
re-adopted the law without making any 
changes.70 The president this time brought the 
law before the Constitutional Court. In June 
66  However, interestingly, the executing regulation 
has not been harmonized with the new law and 
continues to impose a 20% cap on foreign 
investment.
67  For extensive coverage, see Sümer, 2010, p. 
110-129.
68  The president pointed out in his veto that the 
highest audience rate in Turkey was 14-16%.
69  Sözeri, 2009, p. 133.
70  Law no. 4756 of 14 May 2002.
3.2.2. Ownership Regulations
While the primary legislative motive in the 
adoption of the Broadcasting Law in 1994 was 
to rapidly complete the frequency allocations 
rather than to regulate media ownership,62 the 
law did include a provision restricting media 
ownership. Article 29 barred, inter alia, 
political parties, associations, unions, profes-
sional associations, foundations, cooperatives 
and local governments from owning media or 
partnering with media enterprises. Cross-
media ownership and foreign ownership was 
limited to 20%, and each foreign investor was 
barred from having a share in more than one 
media enterprise. Individuals who had a 10% 
share or more in a broadcasting company were 
precluded from entering into public tenders. 
And yet, these restrictions failed to preclude 
“the emergence of media tycoons in the Turkish 
media sector since the media proprietors 
abused the loopholes in the monitoring of the 
law and kept ‘veiling’ their actual shares.”63 
Today, the largest media groups in Turkey not 
only dominate the media sector, but also have 
investments in many other sectors of the 
economy and “there seems to be no efficient 
way to control the concentration of media 
ownership.”64 
In June 2001, parliament introduced significant 
amendments to the Broadcasting Law with the 
stated goal of introducing transparency to the 
ownership of the media.65 The amendments 
introduced the annual average ratio of 
audience as the new criterion for measuring 
ownership. Accordingly, the capital share of a 
real or legal entity or a capital group would not 
exceed 50% in a broadcasting company whose 
62 Sümer, 2010, p. 130.
63  Ibid, p. 131.
64  Papathanassopoulos, 2005, p. 194.
65  Law no. 4676 of 7 June 2001.
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give no indication of their content71 and 
contains multiple amendments to various laws, 
ranging from the criminal code to the press law, 
from laws governing the environment to those 
regulating the financial sector. This patchwork 
style of law-making has become a characteris-
tic feature of the reform process in recent years, 
further complicating the already complex 
regulatory framework concerning the media, 
fundamental rights and liberties as well as 
other areas of social life.    
3.3.1. The Constitutional Framework 
In recent years, relative progress has been 
made in reforming the constitutional provisi-
ons on the media, though Turkey continues to 
be governed by the 1982 Constitution, a 
by-product of the 1980 military coup d’état. The 
2001 constitutional amendments removed the 
prohibition in Articles 26 and 28 of minority 
languages in the expression and dissemination 
of thought and in media. But the amendments 
left untouched wide restrictions attached to 
the exercise of these rights on grounds of 
71  Typically, the names of these reform packages 
are “Laws on the Amendment of Certain Laws.”
2002, the Constitutional Court issued a stay of 
execution of the provisions vetoed by the 
president and suspended them altogether in 
September 2004. Thus, limitations on media 
ownership outlined in the original Broadcas-
ting Law of 1994 remained in force, while the 
prohibition on private broadcasters from 
bidding in public tenders was lifted and the 
limit on foreign investment was increased from 
20% to 25%.
In recent years, the debate on media owners-
hip has resurfaced; this time, however, it also 
concentrated on foreign investment in the 
Turkish media sector. Law no. 6112 increased 
the maximum limit on foreign investment from 
25% to 50%, on the condition that the same 
foreign investor cannot invest in more than 
two broadcasting companies. The increase in 
the cap on foreign investment will have great 
repercussions on media ownership in Turkey, 
already evident from the international 
companies which have been awaiting the 
adoption of the law in order to commence 
bidding on the local media market. The law 
increases the ceiling on media ownership from 
20% to 25%, and limits to four the number of 
media service providers any real or legal entity 
can be a partner of. The law preserves the ban 
on political parties, associations, unions, 
professional associations, foundations, 
cooperatives and local governments to own 
broadcasting companies.
3.3. CONTENT REGULATION
Turkey lacks a unified and coherent content 
regulation on the media. The overregulation of 
the sector through multiple laws and regulati-
ons has been exacerbated in the EU accession 
process through multiple “reform packages” 
hastily adopted by parliament without having 
gone through a process of deliberation and 
consultation with civil society and the media. 
Each package law carries identical titles which 
In recent years, the debate on media ownership has 
concentrated on foreign investment in the Turkish media sector. 
Law no. 6112 increased the maximum limit on foreign investment 
from 25% to 50%, on the condition that the same foreign investor 
cannot invest in more than two broadcasting companies. 
The overregulation of the sector through multiple laws and 
regulations has been exacerbated in the EU accession process 
through multiple “reform packages” hastily adopted by 
parliament without having gone through a process of 
deliberation and consultation with civil society and the media. 
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right to protect their news sources, and grants 
individuals’ right of reply to defamatory or 
untruthful news. At the same time, the law 
contains a wide catalogue of restrictions. In 
addition to similar restrictions imposed by the 
constitution, the law also limits freedom of the 
press in the name of “the protection of the 
independence and impartiality of the 
judiciary.”72 Prosecutors widely interpret the 
concepts of “national security,” violation of 
“territorial integrity” and “disclosure of state 
secrets” to bring cases against journalists who 
report news deemed to be against state 
interests, such as the disclosure of human 
rights abuses by security forces in the name of 
the fight against Kurdish insurgency, criticisms 
of the military’s interference into politics and 
disclosure of failed coup attempts by high-
ranking military officers. Article 11 attributes 
criminal liability to editors and translators of 
written work where the author is abroad or 
unidentified. 
One main difference of the new Press Law is 
the requirement imposed on the owners of 
publishing companies to receive permission to 
publish from the prosecutor and the granting 
to prosecutors the power to seize printed 
documents. Under the previous press law, 
district governors were designated as the 
authority to notify in order to receive permissi-
on to publish. The shift of powers from the 
executive to the judicial branch is potentially 
restrictive to the freedom of the press since it 
72  Article 3 reads: “The press is free. This freedom 
includes the right to acquire and disseminate 
information, and to criticize, interpret and create 
works. The exercise of this freedom may be 
restricted in accordance with the requirements of 
a democratic society to protect the reputation 
and rights of others as well as public health and 
public morality, national security, public order 
and public safety; to safeguard territorial 
integrity; to prevent crime and the disclosure of 
state secrets; and to ensure the authority and 
impartial functioning of the judiciary.”
national security, public order, and the 
integrity of the state with its nation and 
territory. In case of violation of these restricti-
ons by the print media, Article 28 authorises 
seizure by court order and allows, where delay 
poses a danger, immediate seizure by compe-
tent authorities, pending a court order, within 
24 hours. The right to privacy protected under 
Article 20 is also subject to similar restrictions 
on grounds of public order, national security, 
prevention of crime, public morality, public 
health and protection of the rights of others. 
Under Article 29, there is no requirement to 
receive a prior permit to publish periodicals 
and non-periodicals. Article 133 guarantees 
the right of private companies to establish and 
operate radio and television stations, subject 
to conditions laid out in the Broadcasting Law. 
3.3.2. The Legislative Framework 
There are two principal types of laws regula-
ting media content in Turkey: the media-
specific laws that directly regulate the sector, 
and laws in the penal system which severely 
curtail the content of the media. 
Media-specific Laws
The Press Law, adopted anew in 2004, is a 
legislation that is liberal on its face and yet 
quite authoritarian between the lines. Rights 
that are tenets of free and independent media 
go hand in hand with severe restrictions that 
are characteristic of authoritarian regimes. 
The law protects freedom of the press and the 
right to information, guarantees journalists’ 
The Press Law, adopted anew in 2004, is a legislation that is 
liberal on its face and yet quite authoritarian between the 
lines. Rights that are tenets of free and independent media go 
hand in hand with severe restrictions that are characteristic of 
authoritarian regimes. 
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RTÜK still maintains significant punitive 
powers, and does not refrain from using them 
through adopting a restrictive interpretation 
of the law’s limitation clauses and imposing 
disproportionate sanctions against media 
operators. The new broadcasting law (no. 6112) 
preserves the enforcing powers of RTÜK, 
which is authorized to issue fines and suspend 
programs found to have violated the law. In 
case of a repeated violation within one year, 
RTÜK may suspend the entire broadcasting 
schedule or even revoke the license of the 
company.
Public broadcasting falls outside the mandate 
of RTÜK and is regulated by a separate law, i.e. 
the TRT Law. The standards of public broad-
casting outlined in the TRT Law are quite 
similar to those laid out in the Broadcasting 
Law: protecting the indivisible unity of the 
state with its territory and nation, national 
sovereignty, the republic, public order and pub-
lic interest; consolidating Ataturk’s ideals and 
reforms; and complying with national security 
policies and the national economic interests of 
the state. Moreover, “TRT’s staff, as public 
employees, has to act in accordance with the 
mandate of protecting the priorities of the 
state,” laid out in Article 9 of the law.75 
75  Barış, 2005, p. 296.
enables courts to open cases against the 
owners of publishing companies that fail to 
comply with the bureaucratic red tape. Courts 
in Turkey do not refrain from making use of 
their powers to seize printed materials on the 
basis of a very restrictive interpretation of the 
freedom of press and speech. 
The Broadcasting Law guarantees individuals’ 
privacy and protects them from offences 
against their person, or libel, beyond the limits 
of criticism, prohibits broadcasts which 
“discriminate or humiliate people on the basis 
of their race, colour, language, religion, 
nationality, sex, disability, political or philo-
sophical opinion, denomination and any such 
considerations”; outlaws incitement to hatred 
and hostility through discrimination; and 
protects minors, the disabled and the weak 
against programs containing exploitation and 
incitement to violence. On the other hand, Law 
no. 6112 preserves most of the content 
restrictions introduced in earlier broadcasting 
laws. The law prohibits broadcasting in 
violation of, inter alia, “the existence and 
independence of the Turkish Republic, the 
territorial and national integrity of the State, 
the reforms and principles of Atatürk”; and 
“the national and moral values of society, 
general morality and the protection of the 
family.”73 These amorphous concepts leave a 
wide margin of maneuver to RTÜK, which has 
the power to sanction broadcasters which do 
not abide by these standards. 
In 2002, amendments made to the law limited 
RTÜK’s sanctioning powers from suspending 
an entire TV or radio broadcasting operator to 
suspending the relevant program.74 However, 
73  Article 8 (the writing mistakes are not made by 
the authors). 
74  Law no. 4756 of 21 May 2002 and Law no. 4771 of 9 
August 2002.
Law no. 6112 preserves most of the content restrictions 
introduced in earlier broadcasting laws. Amorphous concepts 
leave a wide margin of maneuver to RTÜK, which has the 
power to sanction broadcasters which do not abide by these 
standards. 
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Undoubtedly, closely interrelated with 
freedom of expression and media freedom is 
the right to information. Access to true 
information is vital not only for individuals’ 
ability to express themselves but also for the 
media’s ability to provide news to the public. A 
2004 law protects citizens’ right to information, 
requiring public institutions to respond to 
citizens’ queries within 15 days. Citizens have 
the right to apply to administrative courts 
where this rule is not complied with. Authoriti-
es may decline to disclose the requested 
information on grounds of “state secrets.” 
Indirect Content Regulation
In addition to the aforementioned laws which 
are directly relevant for media regulation, the 
Anti-Terror Law and the Penal Code also 
regulate the media through restricting 
freedom of expression and media freedom. 
Both laws perceive the commitment of 
offences through the press and media as an 
aggravating factor in the commission of the 
crimes under their mandates, increasing 
sentences by one third to a half. 
The new Penal Code (no. 5237), adopted in 
2005, has a number of provisions significantly 
curtailing media freedom. The law criminalises 
the encouragement of military personnel to 
break the law (Article 319); alienating the 
people from the military (Article 318); insulting 
the president (Article 299), the government 
and military and security forces (Article 301); 
incitement to crime (Article 214); praising crime 
and criminals (Article 215); incitement to 
hatred and animosity (Article 216); incitement 
to break the law (Article 217). 
The restrictive nature of the Penal Code has 
been challenged before the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) which found, in the 
Düzgören and Ergin group of cases, that the 
conviction of journalists under Article 318 for 
The Internet Law was prepared by BTK and 
entered into force on 23 May 2007.76 The law 
regulates all content on the internet, without 
making a distinction between traditional press 
and online broadcasting and includes social 
networking sites. It lays out the obligations and 
responsibilities of content, space, access and 
collective use providers as well as internet 
crimes. The law restricts freedom of expression 
and access to information in the name of 
combating the following eight categories of 
‘internet crimes’: encouraging suicide; the sexual 
abuse of children; facilitation of the use of drugs 
or stimulators; provision of substances that are 
hazardous to health; obscenity; prostitution; 
gambling; sports betting and games; and crimes 
regulated in the 1951 Law no. 5816 on Crimes 
Against Atatürk. Courts have unlimited power to 
restrict access to the internet in the name of 
preventing these crimes.77 
76  Law on the Regulation of Broadcasts on the 
Internet and on the Fight against Crimes 
Committed through the Internet (İnternet 
Ortamında Yapılan Yayınların Düzenlenmesi ve Bu 
Yayınlar Yoluyla İşlenen Suçlarla Mücadele Edilmesi 
Hakkında Kanun), no. 5651, 4 May 2007.
77  “Upon the decision of judicial authorities, i.e. 
Republican prosecutors and courts, the 
Presidency of BTK can ban access to the internet. 
However, for our Presidency to release such a 
decision the content and domain of the internet 
site to be banned must be located outside of 
Turkey. The Presidency can place a ban on sites 
originating in Turkey based on a court ruling on 
crimes committed by the banned site against 
children and on obscenity.”
Encouraging suicide; the sexual abuse of children; facilitation 
of the use of drugs or stimulators; provision of substances that 
are hazardous to health; obscenity; prostitution; gambling; 
sports betting and games; and crimes regulated in the 1951 Law 
no. 5816 on Crimes Against Atatürk fall within the categories of 
‘internet crimes’. Courts have unlimited power to restrict access 
to the internet in the name of preventing these crimes. 
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The compatibility of Article 6(5) of the Anti-
Terror Law with Article 10 of the ECHR was 
contested before the ECtHR in the case of 
Ürper and Others.79 In this 2009 judgment, the 
Court observed that the practice of banning 
the future publication of entire newspapers, 
whose content was a priori unknown, had a 
preventive effect on the professional activities 
of journalists and amounted to censorship. 
The issue was raised again before the Strasbo-
urg court. In its judgment in Turgay and 
Others,80 the ECtHR noted in particular that in 
its judgment of June 2009, the Constitutional 
Court of Turkey did not take into account the 
judgment of Ürper and Others v. Turkey and 
once again found the suspension of future 
publications of a periodical to be in violation of 
Article 10 of the ECHR.   
into consideration the nature of acts that result in 
the suspension of the publication of periodicals, 
the magnitude of damage caused by the 
commission of those offences through the press 
and the media, as well as the aim, extent and 
methods of terror in our country and the facility of 
the press and media organs to communicate with 
the masses and the former’s influence on society, 
it has been concluded that the provision in 
question aims at the continuity of democratic 
society.”
79  ECtHR, Ürper and Others v. Turkey, Application 
Nos. 14526/07, 14747/07, 15022/07, 15737/07, 
36137/07, 47245/07, 50371/07, 50372/07 
and 54637/07, 20 October 2009.
80  ECtHR, Turgay and Others v. Turkey, Application 
Nos. 8306/08, 8340/08 and 8366/08, 15/6/2010, 15 
June 2010.
having published statements or distributed 
leaflets considered to be an incitement to 
refuse to do the mandatory military service to 
violate Article 10 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. 
The Anti-Terror Law (no. 3713), as amended in 
2006, has similarly restrictive provisions 
curtailing freedom of the press. Article 6(2) 
makes it an offence to print or publish the 
declarations or leaflets of terrorist organizati-
ons. Under Article 6(4), where such offence is 
committed through the press or the media, the 
owners and editors in chief of the media organs 
concerned are also liable to a fine. The most 
problematic provision of the Anti-Terror Law is 
Article 6(5), which allows the suspension of 
periodicals for a period of 15 days to up to one 
month by court order or, where delay is 
detrimental, by a prosecutor. Article 7(2) makes 
it an offence to disseminate propaganda in 
favour of a terrorist organization, subject to 1-5 
years of imprisonment. Where such offence is 
committed through the press and media, the 
sentence is increased by half. The article also 
imposes liability to the owners and editors in 
chief of the press and media organs concerned. 
The constitutionality of Article 6(5) was 
contested by former President Ahmet Necdet 
Sezer before the Constitutional Court on the 
grounds that suspension of the future publica-
tion and distribution of a periodical pursuant 
to the ruling infringed upon the freedom of the 
press as protected under Article 28 of the 
Constitution. In its judgment of 18 June 2009, 
the Constitutional Court found Article 6(5) to 
be compatible with the constitution and 
rejected the president’s request for 
annulment.78 
78  Constitutional Court, decision no. 2009/90, 
published in the Official Gazette of 26 November 
2009. In its judgment, the Court pointed out the 
public interest in combating terrorism: “…taking 
In this 2009 judgment, the ECtHR observed that the practice of 
banning the future publication of entire newspapers, whose 
content was a priori unknown, had a preventive effect on the 
professional activities of journalists and amounted to censorship. 
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of allowing the exercise of this right upon 
demand, the government a priori identified 
which languages merited to benefit from the 
law. The selected minority languages were the 
Zaza and Kırmançi dialects of the Kurdish 
language, Circassian, Bosnian and Arabic. The 
duration, scope and nature of broadcasting in 
these minority languages were not specified in 
the laws, but were left to the discretion of 
RTÜK. 
Regulations adopted by RTÜK further restric-
ted the already limited and conditional rights 
granted by parliament. The 2002 regulation 
established direct state control over broadcas-
ting, prohibited children’s programming and 
the teaching of minority languages, imposed 
significant time restrictions on broadcasting in 
minority languages, subjected broadcasting to 
rigid bureaucratic control, required simultane-
ous and subsequent translation into Turkish 
for TV and radio programs, respectively, and 
prohibited broadcasting in violation of 
national security, general morality and the 
indivisible territorial and national integrity of 
the state.83 The 2004 regulation allowed 
private broadcasting in minority languages at 
the national level for the first time, but again 
subject to strict time limitations and much red 
tape. Local and regional broadcasters were 
required to submit an audience profile to RTÜK 
in order to receive permits. 
In an attempt to address criticisms regarding 
the incompatibility of these restrictions with 
freedom of the press, RTÜK adopted a further 
regulation in November 2009 which lifted the 
time restrictions for private broadcasters and 
allowed for 24-hour broadcasting in languages 
other than Turkish. The regulation also 
83  D. Kurban, A Quest for Equality: Minorities in 
Turkey, Minority Rights Group International 
(2007), p. 17.
3.3.3. Cultural and Political Pluralism 
in the Media
Until recently, broadcasting in languages other 
than Turkish was prohibited in Turkey, excepti-
on being made for Armenian, Greek and 
Hebrew – mother tongues of groups granted 
minority status under the 1923 Treaty of 
Lausanne. The Treaty grants not only non-
Muslim minorities, but all citizens the right to 
use “any language … in the press, or in 
publications of any kind”. However, Turkey has, 
until recently, never allowed any minority 
group other than the three Lausanne minoriti-
es to exercise this right. One of the impacts the 
EU accession process has had on the media in 
Turkey was the lifting of this ban and the 
subsequent room for public and private radio 
and TV broadcasting to enter the field at the 
local and national level. 
The 2002 and 2003 amendments to the 
Broadcasting Law effectively paved the way for 
broadcasting in minority languages, without 
explicitly identifying the purpose of the 
reforms to be as such.81 Broadcasting was 
allowed in “the different languages and 
dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens 
in their daily lives”82 with the caveat that such 
broadcasts shall not contradict the constituti-
on and “the indivisible integrity of the state 
with its territory and nation.” However, the 
right to broadcast was not granted to all 
minority languages spoken in Turkey. Instead 
81  The scope of the right was gradually expanded 
through a series of laws. Initially, the reforms 
were limited to public broadcasting in minority 
languages but were gradually expanded over time 
to extend to private broadcasting.  
82  For a problematization of this phrase, see D. 
Kurban, “Confronting Equality: The Need for 
Constitutional Protection of Minorities on 
Turkey’s Path to the European Union,” 35 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review (2003), 
p. 151-214.
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framework for a pluralist media, minority 
media in Turkey continues to be subject to the 
blockade of the state, the mainstream media 
and the judiciary. Surveillance by the military 
and the state as well as harassment by the 
statist and nationalist mainstream media 
often leads to a degree of self-censorship in 
the minority media, which withdraws from 
political debates for fear of persecution. Those 
who nonetheless ‘dare’ to report on sensitive 
political issues face prosecution by the courts. 
In 2010, for example, the Kurdish newspaper 
Azadiya Welat based in Diyarbakır was banned 
by the judiciary several times and its journa-
lists were prosecuted on charges of terrorism. 
3.3.4. Obstacles to Media Freedom 
and Impartiality in Turkey
The independence and impartiality of the 
media in Turkey are curtailed by political 
pressure coming from multiple actors, from 
both within and without the media. As 
explained earlier, the historical development of 
the state-media relationship since the late 
years of the Ottoman Empire has left a lasting 
legacy in the political culture of the country. 
The mainstream media has traditionally 
positioned itself in ideological, economic and 
political proximity to power structures, and 
has failed to develop a presence independent 
from the state. While the subject of political 
pressure on the media has in most cases been 
the armed forces, at times of transition where 
civilians have gained relative power and 
independence vis-á-vis the army, the agent of 
pressure has become the elected government. 
A third principal external actor that imposed 
removed the subtitle/simultaneous translation 
requirement as well as the prohibitions on 
children’s and language-instruction program-
ming. These improvements resulted in the 
increase in the number of radio stations and 
TV channels broadcasting in minority 
languages.84 To be able to monitor these 
broadcasters’ compliance with the law, RTÜK 
recruited new Kırmançi and Zaza-speaking 
staff members (the prevalent Kurdish langua-
ges spoken in Turkey). However, RTÜK’s 
receiving support from local police in underta-
king this monitoring activity is grounds for con-
cern.
On 7 June 2004, TRT commenced broadcasting 
in the five permitted languages. Television bro-
adcasts are 45 minutes per day five days a 
week, while radio broadcasts last 30 minutes 
each day, five days a week. The content and 
time restrictions imposed on broadcasting, the 
red tape imposed on local broadcasters and 
the outdated content of programs have been 
criticised by minorities. They perceive the 
reforms as an attempt by the government to 
deceive the international community by 
creating a false impression about the protecti-
on of minority media in Turkey. On 1 January 
2009, 24-hour public broadcasting in Kurdish 
commenced, followed by the launch in April 
2009 of public broadcasting in Armenian.85 
While TRT has 6 exclusively Kurdish broad-
casts every 24 hours, broadcasting in Armeni-
an is limited to a total of one hour per day.   
Notwithstanding this significant yet limited 
progress in establishing the regulatory 
84  So far, 14 radio stations and TV channels have 
been given authorization to broadcast in Kurdish 
and Arabic. European Commission, Turkey 2010 
Progress Report, p. 32-33.
85  The daily broadcasting in Armenian takes place 
between 07.30-08.00 and 18.00-18.30 at TRT’s 
Voice of Turkey Radio.
Surveillance by the military and the state as well as 
harassment by the statist and nationalist mainstream media 
often leads to a degree of self-censorship in the minority media, 
which withdraws from political debates for fear of persecution. 
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restrictions by bringing charges against 
journalists and media organs based solely on 
the content of the news they publish. 
Some of the cases brought against journalists 
have been based on legislation regulating 
media content. Article 11 of the Press Law, 
which attributes criminal liability to editors 
and translators of written work where the 
author is not a resident of Turkey or is unidenti-
fied, has been used frequently by the judiciary 
against editors who have published Turkish 
translations of foreign-language books on 
controversial political issues. A prime example 
of this is the case brought against Ragip 
Zarakolu for having published books recogni-
sing the Armenian Genocide of 1915. Courts’ 
frequent resort to their injunctive powers 
under the Broadcasting Law has been critici-
zed by the ECtHR in Özgür Radyo v. Turkey, 
finding that the warning and licence suspensi-
ons imposed on a pro-Kurdish radio station to 
be an infringement of freedom of expression.86 
Similarly, Turkish courts do not refrain from 
widely interpreting the powers they are 
granted under the Internet Law. In an 
internationally notorious incident of internet 
censorship, an administrative court in May 
2008 banned the video-sharing website 
Youtube on the ground that it contained videos 
insulting Atatürk. The ban was lifted in 
November 2010 but courts impose “frequent 
website bans, which are disproportionate in 
86  ECtHR, Özgür Radyo-Ses Radyo Televizyon Yayın 
Yapım ve Tanıtım A.Ş. v. Turkey, Application nos. 
64178/00, 64179/00, 64181/00, 64183/00, 
64184/00, 30 March 2006 (holding that 
statements made on the radio, which were found 
by national courts to constitute defamation as 
well as incitement to violence and separatism, did 
not incite violence or hate and had already been 
published by other media organs without being 
prosecuted).
pressure on the media has been the judiciary, 
which has prosecuted thousands of journalists, 
banned dozens of newspapers and journals, 
and banned scores of radio and television 
stations simply for writing, publishing, editing 
and broadcasting news critical of official polici-
es on issues considered to be taboo by the 
establishment. The way in which the judiciary, 
the military and the government impose 
political pressure on the media is discussed in 
detail below.  
Partially as a by-product of these external 
political and legal restrictions, the media itself 
has become an obstacle to its own indepen-
dence and impartiality. The entry of big 
business into the media sector as a result of 
the economic liberalization policies of the 
1980s has irreversibly changed the economic 
structure of the media and consolidated the 
interdependent relationship between the state 
and the media. How this relationship has 
translated into self-censorship will be 
discussed in the final section of this report.  
The Judiciary
As stated earlier, the Turkish legal system is 
extremely restrictive of media content, which 
is evident not only in legislation regulating the 
press, radio, television and the internet but 
also, and more so, in the penal code. The Press 
Law, the Broadcasting Law, the Internet Law, 
the Penal Law and the Anti-Terror Law impose 
significant restrictions on media freedom and 
grant wide enforcement powers to the 
judiciary. Courts widely interpret these 
The Press Law, the Broadcasting Law, the Internet Law, the 
Penal Law and the Anti-Terror Law impose significant 
restrictions on media freedom and grant wide enforcement 
powers to the judiciary. 
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in 2007 started with the magazine’s publicati-
on of a classification by the Chief of General 
Staff of journalists and media organs. On 29 
March 2007, Nokta published sections from a 
diary reportedly belonging to Özden Örnek, 
the former Chief of Navy Forces. Based on this 
diary, the periodical reported that a group of 
generals conspired to stage a coup against the 
elected government in 2004 but were obliged 
to call their preparations off when Hilmi Özkök, 
the Chief of General Staff at the time, opposed 
their attempts. On 13 April 2007, the police 
raided the offices of the magazine, seized its 
computers and opened an investigation. A 
defamation case was brought against Alper 
Görmüş, the Editor in Chief of Nokta. While 
Görmüş was eventually acquitted, his repeated 
requests for the court to look into the alleged 
coup attempts were rejected at the time. In 
later years, the allegations of coup attempts 
formed the basis of the prosecution of Örnek 
and his alleged fellow conspirators. Another 
recent example against freedom of the press is 
the case against İrfan Aktan, who was 
prosecuted for an article he wrote on the 
Kurdish question, published in Express on 15 
October 2009, where he quoted a PKK militant 
and a PKK publication. Aktan was convicted to 
imprisonment of one year and three months 
and the editor of the magazine to a fine for 
having engaged in “the propaganda of the 
terrorist organisation” in violation of Article 7 
of the Anti-Terror Law.
scope and duration”87 and there are ongoing 
cases against mainstream web portals. 
Most of the criminal cases opened against 
media organs and their members rest upon the 
Penal Code and the Anti-Terror Law. Two 
provisions of the Penal Code have recently 
begun being used against journalists to deter 
them from reporting on high-profile cases 
involving the military: Article 285 (breach of 
the confidentiality of investigations) and 
Article 288 (attempting to influence a fair trial). 
A total of 4,091 investigations alone were 
initiated under Articles 285 and 288 of the 
Penal Code against journalists who reported 
on the Ergenekon case.88 Similarly, countless 
journalists have been prosecuted under the 
Anti-Terror Law for having disclosed and 
published the names of public officials 
engaged in the fight against terrorism, enga-
ged in propaganda for the terrorist organisati-
on and published the statements or declarati-
ons of the terrorist organisation. Two of the 
most recent examples concern the weekly 
Nokta and Express magazines. The incidents 
that eventually resulted in the closure of Nokta 
87  European Commission, Turkey 2010 Progress 
Report, p. 21.
88  The case concerns an alleged ultranationalist 
criminal gang involving retired and active senior 
military personnel, members of the intelligence, 
bureaucrats, journalists, academics and the 
mafia who are accused of plotting the overthrow 
of the government.
Countless journalists have been prosecuted under the Anti-
Terror Law for having disclosed and published the names of 
public officials engaged in the fight against terrorism, engaged 
in propaganda for the terrorist organisation and published the 
statements or declarations of the terrorist organisation. Two of 
the most recent examples concern the weekly Nokta and 
Express magazines. 
The confidentiality of investigations 
and attempting to influence a fair trial 
provisions of the Penal Code have 
recently begun being used against 
journalists to deter them from reporting 
on high-profile cases involving the 
military. 
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the basis of “evidence obtained as part of the 
investigation carried out in the Ergenekon 
case,” which could not be disclosed due to the 
“confidentiality of the investigation.” In his 
written response, the prosecutor also warned 
that the “ungrounded comments aimed at 
guiding the public opinion” through alleging 
that the case was political would “contribute 
to the aims and purposes of the terrorist 
organization concerned” and that “such 
broadcasts were being closely monitored and 
evaluated with care” by the prosecutor’s office. 
These statements were interpreted by many 
journalists as a threat. The subsequent 
confiscation by the police of the unpublished 
manuscripts of Ahmet Şık’s book entitled 
İmamın Ordusu (The Army of the İmam) has 
further heated the debate on media freedom 
and undermined public trust in the Ergenekon 
case.90   
Notwithstanding the relative progress in 
bringing Turkey’s content regulation on the 
media in keeping with European standards, the 
country continues to have a very poor record of 
press freedom. According to the latest data by 
the International Press Institute (IPI), 48 
journalists are in prison and more than 700 are 
on trial in Turkey in cases brought on the basis 
90  The book is about the alleged links between the 
Fethullah Gülen movement and the police in 
Turkey.
The most recent development sparking 
debates on media freedom in Turkey has been 
the detention in March 2011 of journalists 
Nedim Şener and Ahmet Şık as part of the 
Ergenekon case. Şener and Şık were arrested 
and subsequently detained on charges of 
“incitement to hatred and animosity”89 and 
“membership of a terrorist organization.” The 
dissident character of these journalists has led 
to an unprecedented public debate on a 
criminal case involving the media in Turkey. 
Nedim Şener is among the few journalists who 
have reported on the case concerning the 
assassination of Hrant Dink; he authored an 
award-winning book pointing out the culpabi-
lity of the state in this murder. Ahmet Şık, on 
the other hand, has worked in media organs 
that had a critical take on the mainstream 
media; most notably, he was a reporter for the 
weekly Nokta which revealed the failed coup 
attempts by senior military officers in 2003-4. 
The detention of these journalists who are not 
believed to be affiliated with the Ergenekon 
terrorist organization has not only given rise to 
protests by different segments of the media 
and society, but has also shattered the public’s 
belief in the Ergenekon case. In response to 
criticisms, the prosecutor issued a written 
statement that Şık and Şener were not 
detained for their acts of journalism, but on 
89  This charge was subsequently dropped. Currently, 
the two journalists are solely charged with 
“membership to the Ergenekon terrorist 
organization.”
The most recent development sparking debates on media 
freedom in Turkey has been the detention in March 2011 of 
journalists Nedim Şener and Ahmet Şık as part of the 
Ergenekon case. Şener and Şık were arrested and subsequently 
detained on charges of “incitement to hatred and animosity” 
and “membership of a terrorist organization.” 
According to the latest data by the 
International Press Institute (IPI), 48 
journalists are in prison and more than 
700 are on trial in Turkey in cases 
brought on the basis of several 
provisions of the Press Law, the Penal 
Code and the Anti- Terror Law. 
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against the government’s allegedly fundamen-
talist activities which ‘threatened’ the secular 
nature of the republic, of which it remained the 
guardian. Interestingly, this was the first 
incident where the military used the new 
media for sending its message to influence 
public opinion.          
The media has not been immune from the 
military’s interference into politics. At times, it 
has provided the platform to announce the 
military’s take-over of power, as in the case of 
the army’s declaration on TRT after each coup 
d’état it has staged. At others, the media has 
published ‘news’ provided by the military 
without checking its accuracy, as in the case of 
fictitious news against two respected journa-
lists during the February 28th process. A more 
direct and targeted way in which the military 
has used the media for its ends is in the Chief 
of Staff’s accreditation system, whereby only 
select media organs and journalists are 
allowed to attend press conferences organized 
by the military. According to a document 
allegedly prepared by the Chief of Staff - and 
published by Nokta prior to its closure - journa-
lists in Turkey were classified as being either 
pro or anti-military. The Chief of Staff has 
never refuted this claim though the article was 
one of the grounds for the search warrant 
issued by a military court against Nokta, 
culminating in the closure of the periodical 
soon after. The price Nokta has had to pay for 
publishing news critical of the army was a vivid 
indicator of the potential consequences of 
being a media organ or journalist perceived to 
be against the army by the military. In addition, 
a further repercussion of non-accreditation for 
of several provisions of the Press Law, the 
Penal Code and the Anti- Terror Law.91 In 2009, 
Turkey ranked 122nd in freedom of the press, 
falling 20 places in comparison to 2008 due to 
a surge in cases of censorship, especially 
towards the Kurdish media, and efforts by 
government bodies, the armed forces and the 
judiciary to control media content. In 2010, 
Turkey ranked 138th out of 178 countries.92 
The Army
As discussed earlier, the army’s involvement in 
politics in Turkey dates back to the founding 
years of the republic. From the outset, the 
military has positioned itself as the guardian 
of the fundamental principles of the regime, in 
particular those of laicism and territorial unity. 
The myth constructed around the army as the 
protector of the republic has penetrated into 
the political culture and consolidated the 
influence of the military in every walk of life. 
The military has always exerted power over the 
political and legal structures of Turkey. What 
has changed across time is the degree and 
directness of its interference into politics. At 
times, the army took over power through 
staging military interventions, as in 1960, 1971 
and 1980. At other times, its interference took 
milder forms, as in the February 28th post-
modern military coup process. The most recent 
example was the Chief of Staff’s ultimatum to 
the AK Party Government on April 27th, 2007, 
issued through its website, prior to the 
presidential elections, which culminated in the 
election of AK Party’s candidate Abdullah Gül. 
The Chief of Staff ‘informed’ the public opinion 
91  Bianet, “Türkiye’de Kaç Gazeteci Hapiste?,” 8 
October 2010, available at:  http://bianet.org/
bianet/bianet/125321-turkiyede-kac-gazeteci-
hapiste (last visited on 01 December 2010). 
92  Reporters Without Borders, Press Freedom Index 
2010, available at: http://en.rsf.org/press-
freedom-index-2010,1034.html (last visited on 1 
December 2010).      
According to a document allegedly prepared by the Chief of 
Staff—and published by Nokta prior to its closure—journalists 
in Turkey were classified as being either pro or anti-military. 
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to the military and police intelligence well in 
advance.94
The Government
The AK Party government in general and Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in particular 
have performed quite poorly on matters of 
freedom of the press, adopting controversial 
94  On 6 February 2004, Hrant Dink, the founder and 
editor in chief of the Armenian-Turkish weekly 
Agos, published an article in his paper which 
suggested the possibility of Sabiha Gökçen, 
Atatürk’s adopted daughter and the symbol of 
the educated, modern Turkish woman, may have 
been an adopted Armenian orphan who survived 
1915. What was particularly striking about this 
news is that Gökçen was Turkey’s first female 
pilot and the world’s first female combat pilot. 
When this news was covered on the front page by 
Hürriyet, the most popular daily, a number of 
columnists in the mainstream media reacted 
strongly to Dink. Finally, the Chief of Staff issued 
a public statement rejecting as unacceptable the 
allegations on Sabiha Gökçen and indirectly 
accusing Dink of threatening national unity and 
peace in Turkey. This incident made Dink the 
target of verbal and physical attacks by the media 
and extreme right wing groups. Meanwhile Dink 
was convicted of “denigrating Turkishness” on 
the basis of an indictment which deliberately 
distorted his writings and portrayed him as a 
threat to the “Turkish nation.” The media’s 
overall coverage of the case was extremely biased, 
making him a target of further nationalist attacks 
and hate crimes. Eventually, Dink was 
assassinated on 19 January 2007 by a 17 year old 
Turkish nationalist who told the police that he 
killed Dink because he read in the papers that the 
latter hated the Turks. For excellent coverage of 
Dink’s life and the responsibility of the media in 
his murder, see T. Çandar, Hrant (2010).
journalists, especially those based in Ankara, 
is an inability to access information about the 
military, which is a further deterrence against 
publishing news critical of the army.       
While all media is subject to these general and 
specific threats of intimidation or pressure by 
the military, the minority media is particularly 
susceptible, mainly because they fall outside 
the purview of the large media conglomerates 
protected by the political and economic 
networks of their owners. Turkey’s recent 
history is full of incidents where members of 
the minority media have been prosecuted 
under the Anti-Terror Law and the Penal Code; 
discreetly or openly threatened by state 
agents, military officers, mafia and criminal 
networks; killed in daylight by “unidentified 
perpetrators”; tortured by agents of the 
military regimes; imprisoned for years for 
having criticised state policies or advocated 
the rights of minorities; and reported on taboo 
issues such as clandestine coup attempts by 
the military, the Armenian genocide, the 
Kurdish question etc.93 One of the most tragic 
instances of persecution of dissident journa-
lists is the conviction of the Armenian journa-
list Hrant Dink for “having insulted Turkish-
ness” followed by his assassination by agents 
of a criminal network whose plans were known 
93  Ö. Öğret and S. Martens, “Pressing for Freedom: 
Two Centuries of Ceaseless Struggle in Turkey,” 
Hürriyet Daily News, 7 June 2010, available at: 
http://www.Hürriyetdailynews.com/n.
php?n=part-iii-requiring-a-gut-feeling-
alongside-a-lot-of-guts-2010-06-07 (last visited 
on 10 September 2010).      
While all media is subject to these general and specific threats 
of intimidation or pressure by the military, the minority media 
is particularly susceptible, mainly because they fall outside the 
purview of the large media conglomerates protected by the 
political and economic networks of their owners. 
The AK Party government in general 
and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan in particular have performed 
quite poorly on matters of freedom of 
the press, adopting controversial 
positions and policies against media 
groups and journalists critical to the 
government. 
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attacked freedom of the press was in 2010, 
when he called upon the media patrons to 
dismiss columnists who criticised the 
government’s economic policies, arguing that 
their distorted portrayals would serve to 
de-stabilise the proper functioning of the 
Turkish economy. 
The AK Party government’s biggest and most 
infamous conflict with the media occurred in 
September 2009, when it levied on the Doğan 
Media Group a record 2,5 billion dollar fine for 
tax evasion. While the government portrayed 
this as a routine instance of enforcement of tax 
laws, many interpreted it as a punishment 
against the company for its anti-government 
and pro-military position. Although the 
government announced a tax amnesty in 
November 2010 by which Doğan media groups’ 
financial debts were reduced by half, the court 
case against the group continues. The 
European Commission noted that “the press 
exercises self-restraint when reporting 
following the initiation of this case.”96
The impartiality of the public broadcaster TRT 
has always been in question in Turkey and the 
agency has been criticised for “its permanent 
endorsement of the official position of the 
state and/or government on almost any 
subject ... and careful avoidance from any 
96  European Commission, Turkey 2010 Progress 
Report, p. 21.
positions and policies against media groups 
and journalists critical to the government. 
Erdoğan became notorious for the civil cases 
he brought against dissident cartoonists who 
depicted him as various animals in criticising 
his policies. Though he lost each of these 
lawsuits, the Prime Minister’s intolerance 
against criticism seems not to have changed. 
In September 2008, the Prime Minister 
appealed to the public to boycott the newspa-
pers of the Doğan media group which had 
implicated complicity by senior AK Party 
officials in one of the biggest fraud cases in 
Germany; the case concerned an Islamic 
charity organisation which was found to have 
embezzled its charitable contributions. The 
Turkish media severely criticised the govern-
ment for affording protection to individuals in 
Turkey accused by the German court of being 
the masterminds of this scheme, including 
Zahid Akman, the then head of RTÜK and the 
highest executives of Kanal 7, a pro-
government TV channel. The Turkish press 
accused these individuals of channeling 
embezzled funds to Turkey and even claimed 
that some of the money might have been 
funneled to the AK Party government. While 
Germany cancelled the licence of Kanal 7 INT in 
Germany, Erdoğan rejected persistent appeals 
to dismiss Akman from his public position as 
the head of the media watchdog agency.95 
Another notorious instance where the Prime 
Minister publicly confronted the media and 
95  Deniz Feneri e.V. (Lighthouse), a German-based 
Islamic charitable organization, was found by a 
German court to have embezzled 58 million Euros 
in charitable contributions mostly collected from 
Turks living in Germany, at least 17 million Euros 
of which were channeled to private enterprises 
within the Islamic community in Turkey. While 
the Frankfurt court convicted three staff 
members of the company in Germany, it passed 
the ball to Turkish authorities stating that the 
actual masterminds of the fraud were in Turkey.  
Following AK Party’s ascension to power, there has been a 
considerable change in TRT’s broadcasting policy. Political 
issues such as Cyprus, relations with Armenia and the 
Armenian genocide, the Kurdish question and the army’s 
intervention into politics are now being discussed and debated 
on television and the radio. 
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engagement with controversial issues.”97 In 
recent years, following AK Party’s ascension to 
power, there has been a considerable change 
in TRT’s broadcasting policy. Political issues 
such as Cyprus, relations with Armenia and 
the Armenian genocide, the Kurdish question 
and the army’s intervention into politics are 
now being discussed and debated on television 
and the radio. Programs investigating the 
country’s recent past and questioning the 
official history narrated by the state are 
regularly being aired by the TRT. This change is 
a reflection of the weakening of the army’s 
power over politics as part of the process of 
democratisation in Turkey. With the coming to 
97  Ibid.
power of a government whose position on the 
core political issues is in contradiction with the 
official position of the state and which, based 
on its democratic legitimacy, claims the power 
to set Turkey’s official policies on these issues, 
the state – i.e. the army - has lost its control 
over TRT. Having said this, TRT’s impartiality 
continues to be a matter of contention in 
Turkey. Opposition parties and mainstream 
media organs critical of the government 
criticise public television for being too close to 
and partial towards the government and for 
not standing at an equal distance from all 
political parties.
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few small but effective independent and 
alternative media organs in the past years has 
shattered the ability of the mainstream media 
to filter controversial news that challenge the 
state’s interests and policies. The weekly 
Nokta and daily Taraf published documents 
leaked from within the military documenting 
clandestine coup plans by senior retired and 
active military officers, documents which 
evidently had also reached but had not been 
used by the mainstream media organs. Even 
after the publication of these documents in 
Nokta and subsequently in Taraf, the mainstre-
am media by and large chose to downplay the 
gravity of the claims, whereas those media 
organs sympathetic to the government 
selectively published news that suit AK Party’s 
interests and policies. 
At the same time, the increase in access to the 
internet and social networking sites has 
provided another alternative space for the 
production of politically controversial news 
which would not make it through the filters of 
the mainstream media. They made possible 
citizens’ participation in news making and its 
dissemination. Particularly striking were 
Liberal theory has assumed a critical role in 
the media in democratic systems. Accordingly, 
the media is portrayed as the “Fourth Estate” 
which is independent and free from the 
executive, the legislature and the judiciary, 
and monitors the government on behalf of 
society. Critical theory, on the other hand, has 
viewed the media as the ideological apparatus 
of the state, particularly after the experience 
of WWII, where the media was instrumentali-
zed by governments to “manufacture consent.” 
Today, the concentration of media ownership 
and the relationship between media and 
politics has become the new object of media 
studies. While it is by and large accepted that 
the media does not have absolute power over 
the masses, its ability to determine the public 
agenda gives it the potential to act in the 
interest of existing power structures. 
In Turkey, since the early days of the republic, 
modernisation has been associated with 
democratisation based on the assumption that 
the more the society was modernised, the 
more democratic the regime would be. The 
media has been considered one of the leading 
actors of the modernisation process and 
assumed a critical role in this state-guided pro-
ject as both the producer and the consumer of 
statist ideology.
Today, the mainstream media in Turkey 
continues to by and large be instrumentalised 
by the state and lacks the ability and will to 
function properly as the “Fourth Estate.” At 
the same time, however, the emergence of a 
In Turkey, since the early days of the republic, modernisation 
has been associated with democratisation based on the 
assumption that the more the society was modernised, the 
more democratic the regime would be and the media has been 
considered one of the leading actors of the modernisation 
process. 
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traditional and new media in Turkey.98 It is not 
only the media organs but also the users of the 
new social media that resort to hate speech 
against minorities, dissidents and human 
rights activists. Readers’ comments on the 
internet sites of newspapers, in particular, 
reveal an ideological dichotomy of “us” versus 
“them” where the latter refers to any real or 
legal person that criticizes official policies on 
controversial issues such as the Kurdish and 
the Armenian questions, civil-military 
relations, and the EU process. The absence of 
a legal framework criminalizing hate speech 
and the existence of penal laws restricting free 
speech encourage and indeed empower the 
“militant citizen” as both producer and 
consumer of the media.  
In conclusion, the processes of economic 
liberalization, the banking crisis and the EU 
accession process generated reforms which, 
albeit slow and at times incoherent, changed 
the ownership structure of the media in Turkey 
and enhanced freedom of the press and 
freedom of expression, at least relatively. 
Nonetheless, these developments failed to 
ensure media independence and freedom in 
Turkey. Much remains to be accomplished to 
liberalize media regulation, and more impor-
tantly and challengingly, to change the 
prevalent authoritarian mindset in state, 
society and the media. Nonetheless, the 
opportunities that the information technologi-
es and the new media provide for accessing hit-
98  S. Erler, “Nefret Suçlarında Medyanın Etkisi,” 13 
April 2010, available at: http://www.nefretme.
org/2010/09/nefret-suclarinda-medyanin-
etkisi/#more-581 (last visited on 04 June 2010). 
The 2009 report of an NGO documents the 
prevalence in the Turkish media within the past 
decade of hate speech against ethnic and 
religious minorities. Social Change Association, 
Ulusal Basında Nefret Suçları, 30 April 2009, 
available at: http://www.sosyaldegisim.org/
wp-content/uploads/2010/10/nefret_suclari_
light-.pdf (last visited on 21 March 2010).        
secretly recorded voice and video footage 
implicating senior military officers and 
political figures, some of which have been used 
against suspects in criminal cases, raising 
serious issues in terms of the due process 
rights of the implicated individuals. Indict-
ments filed against hundreds of defendants in 
the Ergenekon case frequently relied on such 
footage. The use of the internet for leaking 
unlawfully obtained documents showing 
illegal conduct has on the one hand provided 
the public with the kind of information that the 
mainstream media did not or could not provide 
and on the other raised serious issues concer-
ning due process and the right to fair trial of 
those incriminated—rightly or wrongly—by 
such information.  
While citizens’ active participation in politics 
through the media may be interpreted as a 
sign of the strengthening of democracy in 
Turkey, such participation is not based on a 
notion of shared citizenship and the embrace 
of core democratic values such as pluralism, di-
versity and equality. A serious impediment to 
constructing a democratic and egalitarian idea 
of citizenship in Turkey is the prevalence of 
hate speech in the media, which enables and 
indeed facilitates the spread of animosity and 
discrimination against minorities and dissi-
dents. Discriminatory news content against 
ethnic, religious, sexual and other minorities 
as well as women is quite prevalent in both the 
While citizens’ active participation in politics through the 
media may be interpreted as a sign of the strengthening of 
democracy in Turkey, such participation is not based on a 
notion of shared citizenship and the embrace of core 
democratic values such as pluralism, diversity and equality. 
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In a post-Nokta and post-Taraf world in Turkey, the media is 
much less able to maintain its ideological alliance with the 
military and the state. More importantly, the increasing 
demands from society for transparency, access to true and 
impartial information and democracy pose a significant 
challenge to the longevity of media policies, culture and ethics 
in Turkey. 
herto censored information pose a great 
challenge not only to the continuity of the 
state’s ability to control the media and society, 
but also to the hegemony of the mainstream 
media over news content. In a post-Nokta and 
post-Taraf world in Turkey, the media is much 
less able to maintain its ideological alliance 
with the military and the state. More impor-
tantly, the increasing demands from society for 
transparency, access to true and impartial 
information and democracy pose a significant 
challenge to the longevity of media policies, 
culture and ethics in Turkey. 
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